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ABSTRACT
Maritime law relating to compensation for environmental damage has been rapidly
developing over the past two decades. This thesis attempts to clarify some of the legal
questions concerning compensable costs and damages by focusing on 1) the right to
compensation for pure economic losses (ie.. economic losses unconnected with personal
injury or property damage) and 2) the right to compensation for damage to natural
resources ("damage to the environment"), including the costs of restoration or
replacement. The questions raised in this thesis are dealt with on the basis of federal
statutory law and non-statutory maritime law. Consequently, state statutes fall outside
this study. Federal statutory laws examined include the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
1980, the Oil Pollutional Act, 1990. and the geographically more limited statutes
including the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 1978, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act. and the Deepwater Port Act, 1974. Because of the general character
and the international significance of the questions involved-and in order to see U.S.
pollution legislation in context-several international conventions are examined. These
include the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969,
the International Convention on the Establislunent of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. 1971, and the Convnention on Civil Liability
for Damage Caused During the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland
Navigation Vessels. 1989. The thesis concludes with comments and suggestions on the
issues covered throughout the paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis addresses the questions concerning compensable environmental damage in
the maritime context. The increasing seaborne transport of oil and other hazardous
substances constitutes a growing pollution risk to US waters and shorelines.' We have
already witnessed several serious accidents which have resulted in some very large oil
spills. Also, other substances than oil have shown to be harmful. Spills and discharges
pollute the water, damage property, threaten persons, and are costly to abate. The public
awareness of the expanding dimensions of the problem has been increased also by spills
from offshore facilities.
Along with the entire body of law governing environmental conservation, the theory
of law relating to compensation for damage caused by spills of oil and other hazardous
substances has been rapidly developing over the past two decades. Of particular
importance in the latter area is the nature and extent of the costs and compensation
awardable for damage to the environment.
The question of awardable compensation in connection with environmental damage
caused by ships (or offshore facilities) is far from clear under U.S. law. A spill or
discharge of oil or other hazardous substance (e.g., chemicals, gases) calls into play a
complex scheme of statutory and case law imposing liability for damage. The notion of
and conditions for compensable damage vary under applicable federal statutes and under
general principles and rules of maritime law (see infra). Consequently it is difficult to
draw a complementary, overall picture of the current standing of the law. However, I
Oil and oil products represent around 38% by volume of total seabome trade. Hazardous cargoes account
for a further 10-15%. Marine Log. 1996.
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will in this thesis try to clarify some of the questions concerning compensable costs and
damages.
Excluded from the thesis will be cases of loss of human life and personal injury.
Although such incidents of course happen in connection with shipping activities 2, they
are fortunately relatively rare in the environmental impairment context. Further, even if
such losses and injuries occur, the claimant's right to compensation seems rather clear-
although there of course remain some problems (concerning both the losses for which
compensation is paid and the evaluation of the injuries).
However, spills and discharges from ships normally cause damage to property.
Boats, fishing gear, water, and embankments may be contaminated. Beaches and
coastlines may be polluted, necessitating clean-up operations at considerable cost.
Preventive measures and cleanup operations may further cause damage to roads, piers
and embankments. But neither the concept of property damage nor the conditions for
compensating such damage create insuperable problems; also U.S. law recognizes both
the principle of restitutio in integrumn (compensation for the reduction in value or for
necessary costs of repair) and the rule that consequential losses (e.g., loss of earnings)
suffered by owners or users of property (e.g., boatowners, fishermen) that has been
contaminated or damaged are compensable.
2 In April 1947 the freighter Grandcamp was being loaded with ammonium nitrate in the port of Texas
City. During loading it was noticed that a fire had started in one of the holds. The only fire-fighting
supply available consisted of two jugs of drinking water and a two-gallon fire extinguisher. This was not
enough to extinguish the fire and consequently it spread and by the time the fire department arrived it was
too late. Less than an hour later the ship exploded with such force that two light planes flying overhead
were destroyed by the blast. The explosion also damaged another ship carrying ammonium nitrate which
was moored 200 yards away. This ship, the High Flyer (no pun intended), caught fire and subsequently
blew up. A total of 468 people were killed, mostly as a result of the first explosion. The accident also
caused considerable material damage.
..___ 
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This thesis focuses on 1) the right to compensation for pure economic losses (i.e.,
economic losses unconnected with personal injury or property damage) and 2) the right to
compensation for damage to natural resources ("damage to the environment"), including
costs of restoration or replacement.
Pure economic losses may hit, for example, a hotel owner when his turnover drops as
a result of pollution affecting the area near the hotel or a fisherman if the fishing
deteriorates because of sea pollution. The main problem with compensating pure
economic losses is that a successful claim generally seems to presuppose that an
individual and defined right (e.g., a right to property or a right of possession) has been
infringed. In the case of environmental impairment, however, interest is often directed
towards cases where public rights (e.g., fishing rights in the sea and the right to use
recreational areas-even when privately owned) have been infringed. Does a pure
economic loss (e.g., loss of earnings) when the right is exercised on a public basis,
qualify for compensation under U.S. law?
In addition to personal injury, property damage and pure economic losses, ships
carrying oil and other hazardous substances may cause damage to the environment, e.g.,
to wildlife and to food chains in the environment. The question of compensating damage
to the very environment, i.e., to the natural resources, presents many problems. This type
of damage cannot easily be assessed in monetary terms; the marine environment lacks a
market value as such. How then, should compensation be assessed?3 Further, even if the
3 In the case of property damage, the compensation may relate either to the costs of repair or to the costs of
replacement. If the costs of repair exceed the value of the property before the damage was caused,
compensation will generally be paid for the cost of replacement. In the case of damage to natural
resources, restoration is the main alternative. The test of reasonableness has to be applied in determining
the costs of restoration.
_
environment pe se constituted an object protected by tort law, who would be entitled to
claim compensation? Could a claim for compensation be laid by the private citizen(s) or
should a claim be filed by the authorities (federal agencies, states, municipalities etc.)?
The question of compensating damage caused to natural resources is comparatively
new. Many countries still lack statutes or court decisions dealing with the question of
compensating damage caused to the environment as such. But there is a growing
awareness of the problem and some countries have already enacted legislation concerning
this matter (e.g., Germany, Italy and Norway). Infra I will deal with the problem on the
basis of U.S. law. 4
The questions raised in this thesis are dealt with on the basis of federal statutory law
and non-statutory maritime law. Consequently, state statutes fall outside this study. Such
an exclusion seems appropriate considering the aim and scope of the thesis (notice also
the heterogeneity and diversity of state law ' ). Environmental consciousness increased in
the United States after the Second World War, and in particular after the end of the
1960s. The federal legislature has developed vigorous activity in the field of
environmental law. It has passed comprehensive laws for the protection of land, air, and
water, which can be complemented by the statutes of individual states. The federal
statutes examined in this thesis are the following:
4 It may be added that when a shipping accident occurs, it may be necessary to take measures to prevent or
minimize the damage to the environment (e.g., by using booms around a leaking ship or dispersants to
combat spills of oil or other hazardous substances). It is not always clear whether certain costs should be
considered as costs of preventative measures or as costs of restoring danmaged property. For example, the
costs incurred for the cleaning of a polluted beach may be considered as restoration costs or as costs of
measures taken in order to prevent further damage.
s Many state statutes provide a right of recovery for damages caused by environmental impairment. But
they differ greatly on issues such as the limitation of liability, the defense against liability, and the types of
damages that may be claimed. This creates a confusing pattern of liability that varies from state to state.
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1) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) or Clean Water Act (33 USC s.
1251 et. seq.);
2) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
1980 (CERCLA), amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), (42 USC s. 9601 et. seq.);
3) the Oil Pollution Act, 1990 (OPA) (33 USC s. 2701 et. seq.); and
4) the geographically more limited statutes, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
1978 (OCSLA) (43 USC s. 1801 et. seq.), the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act, 1973 (TAPAA) (43 USC s. 1651 et. seq.) and the Deepwater Port Act, 1974
(DPA) (33 USC s. 1501 et.seq.).
In addition to these federal statutes a claimant may base his action on general
principles and rules of maritime law (maritime tort including public nuisance, the Robins
Dry Dock-doctrine etc.).6
Because of the general character and the international significance of the questions
involved-and in order to see the U.S. pollution legislation in context-it is also
interesting to make some comparative notes on solutions adopted in international
conventions, i.e., the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1969 (CLC)7 together with the accompanying International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971
6 It may be noted that a state common law action in tort or nuisance is in its substantive content similar to
the law of maritime tort.
7 The CLC came into force in 1975. Sixty-eight states have acceded to the convention.
ii;
(FC) ' (the CL.' and FC were revised by Protocols in 19S84 but these have not yet come
into force), and the Convention on Civil Liability for Dama.e Caused During the
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road. Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels, 1989, (the
CRTD Convention. not yet in force). The United States has not acceded to these
Conventions.
The scope of the present thesis still requires more ciarii cation The paper will
concentrate on damage caused by shipping. Problems concerning environmental
impairment in connection with offshore activity are dealt with only as marginal issues. It
is also to be noted that the application of admiralty jurisdiction is restricted in cases of
accidents occurring on "artificial island" drilling rigs. ' Further, no attempt is made to
define notions and concepts such as "environmental impairment," "hazardous
substances," "natural resources" etc. in the introductory part of this thesis, but I shall take
notice of them when finding them in applicable statutes and r les.
In Part II of this thesis I will make some rather general remarks on admiralty
jurisdiction and maritime law. Hopeful!y, this will serve as useful background
8 The FC came into force in 1978. Forty-five states have acceded to the convention. The FC provided for
the creation of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) to be maintained by
contributions from member states.
9 Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1969 and Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. 1971. The Protocol to the CLC has been
ratified by six States (Australia. France. Germany. Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. and South
Africa) and the Protocol to the FC bv two States (France and Gennany).
10 Paulette Boudreaux Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Comiany. 395 U.S. 352 (1969) involved
wrongful death actions brought by the families of two men who were killed while working on an
artificial island on the outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast. The Supreme Court held that
since the deaths occurred on artificial islands rather than on the high seas, and since Congress, in
enacting the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. intended that such artificial islands were not to be
considered wfithin maritime jurisdiction, the Death on the High Seas Act was inapplicable and its
inapplicability removed any obstacle to the application of Louisiana law by incorporation as federal law
through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
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information for the unacquainted reader. Admiralty jurisdiction furthers important
objectives such as the uniformity of law in maritime matters. This jurisdiction becomes a
very important factor in terms of federalism. Those readers who are familiar with these
issues may move to the following Part. Part III will examine the right to compensation
for pure economic losses in connection with environmental impairment by ships. This
part also contains a more general survey of the applicable statutes and rules. Part IV
deals with the question of damage to natural resources and the right to claim
compensation (including the costs for restoration and replacement). Lastly, Part V
contains several conclusions and comments on the issues covered by this thesis.
The main text of the thesis will endeavor to give the reader an overview of the issues
covered, while more detailed information will be provided in the footnotes.
A. The United States In Ocean Shipping
The importance of the ocean shipping industry to the United States cannot be
_I _ _ _
understated. The United States is the world's largest trading nation. In 1990, U.S. exports
were valued at S393.6 billion, and U.S. imports at S495.3 billion. Hence, U.S.
international trade by surface, air, or ocean transportation modes amounted to S888.9
billion during 1990. Ocean transportation alone, which consists of cargo carried by liner
vessels, non-liner vessels (tramps) and tankers, totaled $445.2 billion in 1990.[11]
The introduction of the steamship in the 19th century radically transformed ocean
shipping,.and led to the creation of the modern steam-powered liner system. It was
around this time period, beginning at the age of steam propulsion, that the legal
community recognized the economic conflict between cargo-owners and shipowners over
risk allocation.[12]
Until the late 1960s or early 1970s, the liner trades used general cargo or break bulk
ships. After the truckload or boxcar load of cargo had been delivered to the pier, these
break bulk ships were loaded by breaking the truckload into small quantities that were
lifted onto the ship by a sling and boom, then stowed.[13]
In the late 1960s the liner industry was dramatically changed by the introduction of
containerization. Containers are large metal boxes that can be placed on a tractor-trailer
chassis, loaded at the exporter's plant, sealed, shipped by truck or train to the port, lifted
onto a container ship by a dockside crane, and stacked in specially designed slots.[14]
The container itself is then unloaded at the destination. This is all accomplished without
directly handling the cargo inside the container.[15]
The introduction of containers represented a revolution in cargo handling, and
continues to have an impact in the 1990s on shipping patterns, shipping companies,
conferences, and alliances. Before containerization, shipping was very labor-intensive,
with limited ship size, increasing wage rates, and slow port turnaround. [16] By 1960,
labor costs in port accounted for 80% of the total cost of a typical voyage.[17] It was
estimated that the average handling time per voyage fell from 157 hours for a non-
containerized ship to 31 hours for a containerized ship, reducing cargo handling costs 65
to 80%.[18] All of the major trade lanes now are containerized, and the impact of
containerization has shifted to developing intermodal services-the efficient merging of
different transportation modes into a seamless whole. [19]
Vessels must be specially designed or adapted to carry containers. Containerization
is highly efficient for carriers because it significantly reduces the time and labor needed
to load and unload a ship. It is preferred by shippers because it means faster delivery
and, by reducing handling, it minimizes breakage and pilferage.[20] Today, virtually all
liner cargo in the largest U.S. foreign trades are moved by containers.[21] Certain U.S.
foreign trades remain substantially uncontainerized because of inadequate financing to
purchase the necessary equipment and facilities, the lack of an infrastructure, or the
nature of the
cargo.[22]
B. Transition to a Global Economy
--- 
I
The implementation of two major multilateral trade pacts in 1994 can be expected to
result in a dramatic increase of international ocean shipping for the United States. In
December 1994, the United States and over 100 other nations ratified the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT creates a World Trade
Organization (WTO) that essentially eliminates most tariffs and many restrictions in
international commerce.[23] GATT is viewed as having "an effect on 'generations to
come' because it will encourage trade among nations."[24] Included in the potential
benefits of GATT is an estimated global income gain of more than $500 billion due to the
reduction of tariffs and quotas.[25] By the year 2005, the liberalization of trade will
produce an estimated $122 billion gain in annual income for the United States alone.[26]
Similarly, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented on
January 1, 1994 by the United States, Mexico and Canada,[27] creates a free trade zone
of over 370 million people comprising a market of over $7 trillion.[28] NAFTA will
make North America the largest and richest market in the world.[29] As commented by
U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown following Congress's ratification of GATT
in December 1994: These treaties-like the GATT and the NAFTA-are responsive to
the realities of global economies. We compete and win by removing tariff and non-tariff
barriers, by moving to a day of global free trade, by making sure that our goods, products,
and services can be exported to our trading partners around the world.[30]
With the passage of NAFTA and GATT, the important role ports and marine
transportation play in the economic well-being of the United States will certainly grow.
I _
Foreign trade is an increasingly important part of the U.S. economy, currently accounting
for over 20% of our gross domestic product. By the year 2010, U.S. exports and imports
are projected to increase in value from $454 billion in 1990 to $1.6 trillion, while the
volume of cargo is expected to increase from 875 million metric tons to 1.5
billion.[31] Various international shipping lines are now experiencing substantial
increases in cargo volume and net profits from ocean shipping that are attributable to the
finalization of GATT and NAFTA.[32] Capitalizing on GATT and NAFTA, cities such
as Baltimore, Seattle and Tacoma already report significant expansion of international
cargo trade ranging from 3% to 16%.[33]
The commercial ports of the United States handle over 95% of international
cargo.[34] Port activity links every community in the United States to the world
market-enabling the marine industry to deliver imported goods more inexpensively to
consumers across the nation and to create export opportunities.[35] Even if the economy
slows down, profits in the U.S. transportation business should remain healthy in 1995.
Railroads, truckers, airlines and shipping companies have all been doing more with fewer
assets. Traffic volumes are up sharply. Rates are rising and profitability is strong.
Returns on equity for the group jumped last year to almost 13% from a five-year average
of 10%.[36]
The intermodal shipping industry is also is experiencing rapid growth. Intermodal is
the fastest growing part of the shipping business, up 15% in November 1994.[37]
Notwithstanding the tremendous growth of international ocean transportation,
shipping concerns still await a uniform scheme for allocating and determining
responsibility for loss, damage, and delay of cargo and goods.
__ .__  .__.__
II. HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF CARGO DAMAGE LAW
A. Pre-Twentieth Century Developments
In the early 17th century, Sir John Davies, the Attorney General for Ireland under
King James I, discussed the independent development of a body of maritime mercantile
law in Great Britain:
That until he understood the difference betwixt the Law Merchant and
the Common Law of England he did not a little marvel that England...
having so many ports and so much good shipping what should be the
cause that in the books of the common Law of England there are to be
found so few cases concerning Merchants of ships. But now the reason
thereof was apparent, for that the Common Law of the land did leave those
cases to be ruled by another law; namely, the Law Merchant, which is a
branch of the Law of Nations.[38]
The "Law Merchant" of early times comprised both the commercial and maritime law
of modern codes, but was peculiarly applied to merchants and developed from the
customs of merchants them selves.[39] These laws essentially concerned the mercantile
and trading community, and were administered in special courts distinct from the
ordinary courts of the land. Foreign merchants, over which the common law frequently
held no jurisdiction, were subject to the Law Merchant.[40]
Even centuries earlier, the Law Merchant had defined the rights and liabilities of the
carrier and shipper. In the sixth century after the founding of Rome, the sea carrier was
made by Roman edict an "insurer" of the goods it carried. The sea carrier was viewed as
preserving good faith, insuring the safety of the goods delivered, and preventing fraud
and robbery.[41] The shipper might not know how his goods had been abstracted or
damaged, nor whether there was anyone whom he could hold responsible. If there had
been "culpa" on the part of the carrier, it could be easily concealed.[42] The reasoning
behind the Roman law was that the carrier should be held liable for all loss and damage
rather than the shipper being deprived of his remedy. In time, however, "exceptions" to
carrier's liability for loss were admitted for shipwreck and piracy.[43]
By the sixteenth century, there was a growing feeling within the European
commercial community that the owner and master of a ship should be excused for non-
delivery or damage to cargo due to perils of the sea, pirates, and unusually bad
weather.[44] These circumstances were recognized as defenses by the year 1570,
available to the shipowner or master who could establish the truth of his contentions.[45]
For loss or damage due to any fault or negligence of the master or crew, the master was
held liable. Bills of lading during that time period typically reflected what the Law
Merchant implied.[46] The rule of the Law Merchant was that the carrier was liable
unless he could prove that the loss of damage occurred through some "inevitable"
mischance, which no amount of care or prudence on his part could have prevented, and
was in fact unattended by "culpa" or negligence.[47]
By the early nineteenth century, general maritime law principles recognized that a
cargo owner who shipped his goods by a marine carrier was given special protection.[48]
In both common law and civil law countries, the carrier was held strictly liable unless it
could prove "(1) that its negligence had not contributed to the loss and (2) that one of the
four 'excepted causes' was responsible for the loss."[49] Thus, the carrier was liable if
__
one of the four exceptions applied and the carrier had been at fault, but in all other cases
the carrier was liable without fault. Amounting to "no fault" liability, a carrier at the time
assumed very broad liability for cargo under general maritime law, and was described as
an insurer of the goods.[50]
However, in deference to freedom of contract, the shipper and carrier could agree to a
different risk allocation-including one in which the carrier assumed virtually no
liabilitv--even for its own negligence.[51] To minimize their role as "quasi-insurers" of
cargo damage and loss, carriers began to use the bill of lading for avoiding liability. By
the late nineteenth century, bills of lading started to contain more exculpatory clauses to
reduce or eliminate the carriers' responsibilities.[52] The bills of lading became so
lengthy that it became difficult to ascertain rights and liabilities. Even bankers were "in
doubt as to their security when discounting drafts drawn against bills of lading, cargo
underwriters [had] not known the risks which they covered when insuring goods ... and
carriers and shippers [were] in constant litigation."[53] The exculpatory clauses typically
included losses and damage from thieves, heat leakage, and breakage; contracts with
other goods; perils of the seas; jettison; damage by sea water; frost; decay; collision;
strikes; benefit of insurance; liberty to deviate; sweat and rain; rust; prolongation of the
voyage; nonresponsiblity for marks or numbers; removal of the goods from the carrier's
custody immediately upon discharge; limitation of value; time for notice of claims; and
time for suit.[54] All of these exculpatory clauses were valid "if reasonable," and the
courts in those days rather stringently interpreted reasonableness in the carrier's
favor. [55]
I _^ ^_ _
The British and American courts differed in their views on the enforceability of broad
exclusions on bills of lading. The British Courts generally enforced bills of lading with
even the most far-reaching exculpatory clauses, viewing the carrier's strict liability under
general maritime principles as essentially a "default rule" to be applied only in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary.[56] In the United States, freedom of contract
was more restricted. The U.S. federal courts allowed carriers to limit their liability in
many circumstances, but carriers could not exonerate themselves from liability if either
negligence or a failure to provide a seaworthy ship was committed by the carrier.[57]
In 1882, the International Law Association ("I.L.A.") at its Liverpool Conference,
prepared a draft of a model bill of lading, amounting to a compromise for voluntary
adoption by shipper and carrier.[58] The model draft provided that the carrier should be
liable for negligence "in all matters relating to the ordinary course of the voyage," such as
the stowage and care of the cargo, but should be exempt from liability for "accidents of
navigation," even though losses might be attributable to negligence of the crew.[59] It
also required a carrier to exercise "due diligence" to make the vessel seaworthy, provided
for a 100 pound (sterling) package limitation in absence of a higher declared value, and
included a list of specific "exceptions" for which the carrier would not be
responsible.[60] Although it never received widespread acceptance, the I.L.A. model bill
achieved some influence in the subsequent Hague rules. [61]
If the carrier brought the cause of the loss or damage within one of the perils excepted
__ __
in the carrier's bill of lading, the cargo owner then had the burden of proving that the
carrier's negligence caused or contributed to the loss, in which event the carrier was
liable.[62] During times before meaningful discovery procedures were implemented, that
burden of proof was a very real defensive weapon, and a source of serious difficulty for
the cargo claimant.[63] In a significant number of cases, this burden was impossible for
cargo shippers to bear.[64]
B. The Harter Act Of 1893
While the international community was accomplishing little toward the unification of
the law in the late 19th century, several countries enacted legislation governing
exculpatory clauses in bills of lading.[65] The general dissatisfaction with the state of the
law, including its short limitation periods and oppressive exemptive clauses, brought
about the movement which resulted in the United States in the Harter Act of 1893.[66]
The Act was "essentially a compromise between the conflicting interests of carriers and
shippers."[67]
The Harter Act recognized some of the common law obligations of the carrier, and
made it unlawful for an ocean bill of lading to diminish specific obligations.[68] As
violative of public policy, the Act voided any bill of lading seeking to relieve the carrier
from negligence in "proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery" of the
goods,[69] and also voided any clause purporting to reduce the obligation of the owner to
exercise due diligence in regard to seaworthiness.[70] However, if the carrier exercised
due diligence in furnishing a seaworthy vessel in all respects, then the owner was exempt
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from liability for damage or loss resulting from "faults or errors in navigation or in the
management of [the] vessel."[71] A shipowner had no liability for the negligence or fault
of his captain and crew in their navigation and management of the vessel because the
owner lacked control after his ship left port and communications were often difficult or
impossible.[72] The shipowner was no longer liable for perils of the sea, acts of God,
acts of public enemies, inherent defects of goods carried, seizure under legal process, acts
or omissions of the cargo shippers, and saving or attempting to save life or property at
sea.[73]
Though an important step in the development of the law of maritime carriage, the
Harter Act was ultimately a disappointment.[74] The Act was not an effective solution to
the shippers' problem of burdensome exculpatory clauses in bills of lading, nor did it
establish any positive rules of law.[75] It also did not alter the validity of very low
limitation or valuation clauses, and failed to address the validity of stringent notice of
claim clauses or very short periods for filing suit.[76]
Passage of the Act was followed by about 30 years of instability, during which the
law relating to shipments to or from the United States differed from that in most other
parts of the world.[77] A movement for uniformity developed, and in culmination of this
movement the Committee Maritime International ("CMI") drafted a set of rules at a 1921
conference at the Hague, based upon the Harter Act theory.[78]
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C. The Hague Rules
As the Harter Act had not ended the controversy, the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading [79] (commonly known
as the "Hague Rules) was adopted by twenty-six participating nations in 1924. Most
shippers welcomed the Hague Rules, although they were adopted against the wishes of
shipowners who opposed the increase in carrier liability under this new convention.[80]
Today, there are about 77 contracting parties to Hague, including a large number of
developing countries.[8 1]
The Hague Rules set out the bases for shipowner liability for cargo loss and
damage.[82] They preclude contractual exemptions from liability on the part of
shipowners; provide shipowners with seventeen specified defenses, including the
controversial "nautical fault" defense; and establish a limit of shipowner's liability of
$500 per package or customary freight unit.[83]
Although there was major American involvement in the final stages of drafting the
Hague Rules, the United States was slow to ratify or enact a statute based upon
Hague.[84] Apparently due to the United States' failure to ratify the convention, other
countries hesitated to adopt the Hague Rules.[85] There even was a movement by British
shipowners in the early 1930's to repeal the United Kingdom law ratifying the Hague
Rules, on the basis that the rest of the world had been seemingly unwilling to accept
international uniformity.[86]
The United States domestically implemented the Hague Rules with the enactment of
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in 1936 (COGSA),[87] and ratified the international
convention in 1937.[88] With the U.S. adoption of the Hague Rules, the world's
remaining maritime powers joined the new regime fairly quickly. Within two years of
the U.S. ratification, most of the European shipping nations followed suit, and by the
beginning of World War II, the majority of the world's shipping was committed to the
Hague Rules.[89]
D. COGSA
Derived from the Hague Rules, COGSA "is really a bill of lading act governing the
relations of cargo and ship, so long as a bill of lading embodies the contract of
carriage."[90] COGSA applies during the time period of between the loading of the
goods and the time they are discharged from the ship, "tackle to tackle."[91]
The enactment of COGSA did not repeal or completely supersede the Harter Act.[92]
The Harter Act still governs carriage of goods under a bill of lading in interstate
commerce, loading and discharge of the cargo, and deck carriage.[93]
COGSA represents some significant changes from the Harter Act and the prior
liability scheme. Its provisions are as follows:
(1) COGSA requires an ocean common carrier operating between the U.S.
and foreign ports to exercise due diligence to make his ship seaworthy,
to make the holds fit and safe for carriage and preservation of the goods
carried, to properly equip the ship, and to load, handle, stow, carry,
keep, care for and discharge the goods properly and carefully.[94] For
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liability to arise, however, it must be shown that the want of due
diligence to make the ship seaworthy was the proximate cause of the
cargo loss or damage.[95]
(2) A carrier will not be liable for any "uncontrollable" loss or damage
falling under any one of the seventeen defenses,[96] which include:
(a) acts, neglect or default of the master or servants of the ship in
navigating and managing the ship [the "nautical fault" defense];
(b) fire-unless caused by the fault of the carrier;
(c) perils of the sea;
(d) acts of God, war, or public enemies;
(e) intervention of law;
(f) acts or omissions of shippers;
(g) strikes, riots, or civil commotion;
(h) attempts to save life or property at sea (this includes damage
caused by deviation to save life or property at sea);
(i) inherent vice of the goods or shrinkage, where the damage is
caused by the characteristics of the goods; i.e., a liquid that
evaporates;
(j) insufficient packing or marking by the shipper;
(k) a latent defect in the goods or damage caused by a defect in the
goods, not the negligence of the carrier; and
(1) any other cause arising without the actual fault of the carrier or
its agents (although the burden is on the carrier to prove
freedom from fault).[97]
(3) A $500 per package or customary freight unit limitation, unless the
value of goods is declared on the bill of lading.[98] The carrier is
barred from using a lower limitation amount.[99]
(4) What constitutes a "package" under COGSA has created some
problems for the courts, especially in light of the now common use of
the shipping container.[100] Jurisdictions are split on whether a
container could be considered a package for purposes of the $500
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limitations. [101]
(5) The Act extends the time to provide notice of claim and file suit
against the carrier. Notice of the loss should be provided to the carrier
before or upon removal of the goods, or within three days after removal
if the loss is not apparent.[102] Claimants have up to one year to file
suit following delivery.[103] Lesser time limits (which may have been
allowed under the Harter Act) are prohibited under COGSA.[104]
(6) COGSA does not apply when cargo is carried on deck, where the bill
of lading states that the cargo will be carried on deck.[105]
(7) Under COGSA, unexplained losses, or losses where there is no clear
evidence which of two causes was responsible for the damage, are far
more likely to fall on the carrier.[106]
COGSA's principal goal was not so much to revise the rules of substantive law, but to
unify the law governing bills of lading world-wide. It attempted to do so in a uniform,
predictable manner "that would allow carriers, shippers, consignees, bankers, and
insurers to know their respective rights and responsibilities with certainty . .. without the
necessity of examining long and complicated bills of lading."[107]
III. INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS, CONVENTIONS AND
AMENDMENTS ATTEMPTING WORLD UNIFORMITY ON
__
LIABILITY RULES
Despite the United States' adoption of the Hague Rules through COGSA, several
problem areas remained with the Hague scheme, causing uneasiness for both shippers
and carriers.[108] These problems included the confused state of American law on the
limitation of $500 per package or per "customary freight unit;" the inadequacy of the
$500 package limitation; questions as to what constituted a "package" in view of the
newly-developed container trade; concerns about the rigid non-delegability of the duty to
use due diligence to make seaworthy; and the contractual extension of the carriers
defenses to other parties to the transaction such as stevedores.[109]
A. Visby Amendments of 1968
Decades later, largely in response to the emergence of containerization in ocean
transportation and international dissatisfaction with the per-package limitation, a
diplomatic conference convened in Brussels in 1968 to amend certain provisions of the
Hague Rules through the adoption of a Protocol.[ 110] Under Visby, most of the original
Hague Rules survived, thus preserving most of the case law decided over the last 50
years.[111] Both the Hague Rules and the Visby Protocol retain the same basic rule of
carrier liability, requiring the carrier to exercise "due diligence ... to make the ship
seaworthy," and to see that the ship is "properly manned, equipped and supplied."[112]
That conference resulted in a 1968 Amendment to the Hague Rules, designated as the
"Hague-Visby Amendments".[113] The 1968 Amendment modified Hague in several
respects. First, the Amendment increased the per-package limitation to $663 or $2 per
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kilogram for lost of damaged goods, whichever is higher. Second, the Amendment
clarified the definition of "package" to be the number of packages or units enumerated in
the bill of lading as packed in such "article of transport".[114] Third, the Amendment
denied the carrier the right to limit liability where damage was intentionally caused or
recklessly caused by the carrier with knowledge by the carrier that damage would
ensue.[ 115]
Certain other minor revisions were included in the 1968 Amendment to render it
more consistent with American law. For example, the Amendment made inadmissible
any contradictions of recitals of condition as set forth in the bill of lading when the bill
has been transferred to a party in good faith. The Amendment approved the practice of
granting extensions of the one year time limitation.[ 116] The Amendment also defined
the carrier as including the "owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage
with a shipper."[ 117]
By 1993, it was estimated there were seventy-eight countries that adhered to Hague
and/or Hague-Visby, covering 63.9% of U.S. trade.[1 18] Of that group, by 1993, there
were thirty-two nations that acceded to Hague-Visby.[119] To date, the United States
has not yet adopted or ratified the Hague-Visby Amendments, and the 1936 COGSA
remains substantially unchanged.[120] "As a result, the United States today has a law ...
that is different on its face from the laws of most of its major trading partners and
different in application from the law of any other country."[121] Notwithstanding, most
bills of lading currently reflect Hague-Visby, as carriers reluctantly adjust to raising
liability limits because of containerization.[122] Interestingly, the U.S. courts have been
--
applying Hague-Visby under choice of law rules.[123]
B. Immediate Shipper Enthusiasm For and Carrier Opposition To 1968 Hague-
Visby Amendments
Within only months after the 1968 Visby Convention at which the Hague-Visby
Amendment was promulgated, shippers were pleased with the results and encouraged
prompt ratification by the United States.[124] Joseph P. Baittiner, on behalf of the Singer
Company, summed up the views of most U.S. shippers by expressing support for Hague-
Visby as "a solution equitable to both shipowner and shipper interests . . ."[125]
Speaking on behalf of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York (a shipper's
organization), Joseph A. Sinclair wrote to then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk that his
members were "very pleased" with Hague-Visby and hoped "that the State Department
will make every effort to obtain Congressional action during the present session having
the assurance that ratification of the [Hague-Visby] Convention will be widely supported
by major U.S. exporters."[126]
In contrast, the carriers vigorously opposed ratification of Hague-Visby following the
1968 convention. Ralph E. Casey, then President of the American Merchant Marine
Institute ("AMMI"), which represented most of the U.S. flag steamship lines, doomed the
prospects for any ratification.[127] In his letter to Secretary Rusk dated May 22, 1968,
Mr. Casey expressed "strong opposition" by the AMMI to U.S. implementation of the
Hague-Visby Protocol of 1968. On behalf of shipowners' interests, Mr. Casey criticized
the weight liability limitation as excessive,[128] the mixed limitation concept as having
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no ceiling,[129] and the container clause as especially disturbing.[130] Benjamin W.
Yancey, the former President of the U.S. Maritime Lawyers Association, similarly
expressed "his sharp disagreement" with Hague-Visby.[131]
In the face of such determined opposition from significant portions of the maritime
industry, the Executive Branch decided it could not go forward towards ratification.[132]
Congress' unwillingness to act in the absence of an industry consensus has long been
recognized.[133] For this sole reason, according to a commentator, the Visby
Amendments were not ratified between 1968 and 1978.[134]
C. The SDR Protocol of 1979
In 1979, the Hague-Visby Rules were further amended to account for currency
exchange imbalances.[135] The "SDR Protocol of 1979" revised the previously-existing
Poincare gold standard for liability limitations to a system using a "Special Drawing
Right" (SDR) in an amount calculated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[136]
The liability limitation was increased in the SDR Protocol to 667 SDRs per package
or customary shipping unit, or 3 SDRs per kilo.[137] During 1992, the SDR fluctuated at
around U.S. $1.28.[138]
As is the situation with the 1968 Hague-Visby Amendment, the United States never
adopted the SDR Protocol.[139] Notwithstanding, thirty-one nations adopted or were
adopting the SDR Protocol and Hague-Visby Amendment by 1992.[140]
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D. The UNCITRAL Hamburg Rules of 1978
In 1978, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") held a conference in Hamburg, Germany, in response to a demand for
revision of the Hague-Visby Rules.[141] UNCITRAL had "conceived all of these
problems in terms of economic warfare between cargo and carrier," and between
"traditional maritime nations" and the "developing world."[142]
The Hamburg Rules are quite different from the previous international conventions
on cargo liability in both form and structure, and as the U.S. Department of
Transportation found, would provide for an increase in carrier liability.[143] The major
features and changes of the Hamburg Rules are as follows:
(1) Elimination of the nautical and managerial fault defenses;
(2) Reduction of the seventeen defenses of COGSA, down to three defenses:
(a) that the carrier took all reasonable measures to avoid the damage;
(b) that the loss, damage or delay was caused by fire; or
(c) that the loss, damage or delay was due to efforts of the carrier to save life or
property at sea.
(3) The $500 per package limitation first appearing in the Hague Rules in 1924 and
adopted by COGSA 12 years later, would be increased to 835 SDR's (Special Drawing
Rights) per package, or approximately $1,169 per package or customary shipping unit.
(4) Shippers would be given an option of claiming damages based on the weight of
the cargo rather than the value of the package (maximum recovery of 2.5 SDR's per kilo,
approximately $1.59 per lb. or $1169 per package, whichever is higher).
(5) The term "per package" would be defined as the packaging units described in the
bill of lading, thus curtailing shipowners' attempts to limit their liability to $500 for an
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entire container on the grounds that it is the "package" when no other packaging was
described on the bill of lading.
(6) Carriers would be liable for delays, but only up to 2 1/2 times the amount of
freight charges.
(7) "On-deck" cargo would be covered by liability rules for the first time.
(8) Cargo moving without a bill of lading would be covered for the first time.
(9) The burden of proof would shift to shipowners to prove they "took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences," thus
eliminating negligence of the master or crew as a defense. Under COGSA, the carrier
only has the burden of proving seaworthiness at the time of the voyage, and then the
burden shifts to the shipper to prove the carrier's negligence.
(10) Notice of loss or damage would be permitted to be given not later than one
working day after delivery to the consignee (rather than before removal from the port).
(11) Notice of concealed loss of damage would have to be given within 15 days, in
lieu of 3 days.
(12) Suits or arbitration could be instituted within 2 years from delivery rather than
one year at present.
(13) Cargo owners would be relieved of "General Average" contributions if the
shipowner's negligent navigation or mismanagement of the ship caused the catastrophe
which resulted in the claim for general damage.[144]
The United States has not ratified the Hamburg Rules, which went into force on
November 1, 1992 after ratification by twenty other nations.[145] To date, only twenty-
two nations have adopted the Hamburg Rules, of which seven are land-locked nations
having no ports. All twenty-two nations combined represent a very small portion of U.S.
trade.[146] These nations are not major shipping powers and are more concerned with
protecting their imports and exports.[147]
E. The Multimodal Conventions
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Today, complex inter-relationships bind together carriers, terminal operators, and
multimodal service companies.[148] Multimodal conventions are "intended principally
to deal with the advent of multimodal door-to-door container shipping practices, and to
provide for adequate compensation in cases where damage occurred but the transport
mode on which it occurred cannot be determined."[149]
Since 1975, three voluntary sets of model rules have been established in an attempt to
resolve the tangled web of multimodal relations and establish uniform principles of
liability for multimodal operators. The three sets of rules are the 1975 International
Chamber of Commerce Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport Document,[150] the
1980 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods,[151]
and the 1991 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/International
Chamber of Commerce Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents[ 152] published with
effect from January 1, 1992.[153]
The multimodal proposal given the most attention in the United States is the proposal
of the 1980 Multimodal Convention. This proposal becomes mandatory upon ratification
of a certain number of states and "basically adopts the same approach as the Hamburg
Rules."[154] In addition, it allows for the creation of a new entity, called a Multimodal
Transport Operator (MTO), which could offer to shippers an optional door-to-door
system of liability through a bill of lading.[155]
The 1980 Multimodal Convention limits liability to approximately $1,160 per
package or, alternatively, $3.50 per kilogram. These limits are about ten percent higher
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than the limits in Hamburg. The limits apply when either "(a) the mode on which the
damage occurred cannot be determined; or (b) the mode on which the damage occurred
can be determined and the limits under that mode are lower than those under the
Multimodal Convention."[156] Under the Multimodal Convention, shippers would bring
their claims and lawsuits against the MTO who could then bring a subrogation action
against the underlying actual carrier.
Adherence to the 1980 Multimodal Convention by thirty nations is necessary to bring
it into force. As of May 1991, only five nations had ratified the Multimodal
Convention.[157] As with the Hamburg Rules, years may pass before the Multimodal
Convention enters into force.[ 158]
F. American Bar Association Proposal of 1987
In 1987, the American Bar Association (ABA) attempted to resolve the deadlock with
a compromise between shipper and carrier interests.[159] By majority vote, the ABA's
House of Delegates recommended that the U.S. government support ratification of the
Hague-Visby Amendments-with revisions.[160] The ABA called for the immediate
ratification of the Hague-Visby Amendments, and requested that the U.S. government
consider further changes, such as (1) increasing liability limits from $500 per package to
the $1,160 per package ($3.50 per kilo) as suggested in the 1980 U.N. Convention on
International Multimodal Transport of Goods; (2) eliminating nautical fault as a defense;
(3) placing liability with a single party for intermodal shipments; and (4) subjecting
terminal operators and stevedores to the same liability rules as carriers.[161]
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The ABA's majority report, as outlined above, was drafted by a subcommittee of
eight highly experienced maritime lawyers chaired by Allan I. Mendelsohn, a former U.S.
State Department Legal Advisor and U.S. delegate to several diplomatic transportation
conferences.[162] A minority report favoring adoption of the Hamburg Rules, supported
by shippers, was rejected by the ABA.[163] To date, however, there has been no
industry consensus or congressional action on the ABA's recommendation.[164]
G. Major Differences Between Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Regimes
1. Scope ofApplication
The Hague Rules apply only to bills of lading issued in a contracting state. The
Hague-Visby Rules apply to the carriage of goods between different states, provided that
the bill of lading is issued in a contracting state, the carriage is from a port in a
contracting state, or the parties have agreed to the application of the Convention. The
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules only apply when a bill of lading is issued in connection
with the carriage.[165] For example, COGSA, Hague, and Hague-Visby do not apply
when electronic data interchange is used.[166]
The Hamburg Rules apply to all carriage by sea contracts between two different states
provided that the port of loading, the port of discharge, or the place of issuance of the
transport document is located in a contracting state. Hamburg applies whether or not a
bill of lading or other transport document has been issued.[167]
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2. Definition of "Carrier"
COGSA, Hague, and Hague-Visby only apply to the contracting carrier, but do not
apply to the liability of the actual non-contracting carrier who has not issued a bill of
lading to the consignor.[168] In contrast, the Hamburg Rules governs liability of both the
contractual carrier and actual carrier. Essentially, Hamburg makes the contractual carrier
liable for the whole carriage, including those portions performed by the actual carrier,
and also enables the shipper to hold the actual carrier liable.
3. Period of Carrier Responsibility
COGSA, Hague, and Hague-Visby provide for liability only from the time that the
goods are loaded onto the ship and ends when they are discharged from the ship.[169]
On the other hand, Hamburg covers from the period of time the carrier takes the goods at
the port of loading until the carrier actually delivers the goods at the port of discharge.
Thus, the Hamburg liability regime extends beyond the actual carriage, even before
loading and after unloading.[170]
4. Exemptions/Defenses from Liabilit
Under COGSA, Hague, and Hague-Visby, carriers have the burden to prove the
seaworthiness of the vessel and the exercise of due diligence. However, the carrier has
seventeen defenses from liability.[171] The most controversial is the "nautical fault"
defense, which exempts a carrier from liability when the loss or damage arose from a
negligent act in the navigation or management of the ship.[172]
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The Hamburg Rules no longer exonerate the carrier from negligence for "nautical
fault," and reduce the defenses to three.[173]
5. Limnits of Liability
COGSA and Hague limit the carrier's liability to $500 per package.[ 174] The 1979
Protocol to Hague-Visby raised the limit to 667.67 SDRs or 2 SDRs per kilogram of
goods, whichever is higher. The Visby Amendment allows a shipper an opportunity to
limit the carrier's liability to the equivalent of one package when a large container is
packed with multiple packages of valuable goods.[175]
Under Hamburg, the liability limits have been increased to 835 SDRs (about $1,000)
per package or 2.5 SDRs per kilogram.[176]
6. Delay Danlages
Neither COGSA, Hague, nor Hague-Visby cover carrier damage for delay of
goods.[177] However, Hamburg provides mandatory delay damages in the amount of 2
1/2 times the freight payable for the goods delayed. [178]
7. Deck Cargo
Under Hague, "the carrier is not liable for cargo carried [or stacked] on deck under a
bill of lading that states the cargo is so carried."[179] In contrast, the Hamburg Rules,
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"taking into account modern transport techniques, which often involve stowing
containers on deck, provide suitable rules for deck cargo."[180]
H. MLA-Proposed "Carriage of Goods By Sea Act of 1995"
Another attempt for industry consensus was recently made by the U.S. Maritime
Lawyers Association (MLA). In February 1995, the MLA proposed a draft bill titled the
"Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1995."[181]
The proposal appears to be an attempted harmonization of Hague-Visby and
Hamburg, although primarily based on Hague-Visby. A problem with the MLA proposal
of this sort is that for unilateral action to take place, the United States would have to
denounce the Hague-Visby Rules, a step which is not conducive to international
uniformity.[ 182]
The MLA proposed bill is modeled from the form of the existing COGSA statute.
Key features and revisions to COGSA are as follows:[183]
(1) The "nautical fault" defense of 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) has essentially been
eliminated, as a carrier is now liable where the cargo claimant presents proof of
negligence in the navigation or management of the ship. Section 4(2)(a) of the proposal
provides:
The carriers and their ships shall not be responsible for loss of damage arising or
resulting from-
(1) Act of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the ocean carrier in the
navigation or in the management of the ship, unless the person claiming for such loss is
able to prove negligence in the navigation or management of the ship[184] ...
(2) The fire defense is limited, as a carrier is liable if the cargo claimant proves the
_ I II~_ X
fire was caused by actual fault or privity of the carrier;[185]
(3) The balance of the "17 defenses" are restricted to circumstances only where loss
was not caused by the actual fault and privity of the carrier and/or its agents, the burden
of proof for the defense falling on the carrier;[ 186]
(4) The carrier is proportionately liable for loss or damage shown to be caused by its
agents;[ 187]
(5) Absent any proof of cause of loss or damage, the carrier is liable for one-half of
the loss or damage;[188]
(6) A carrier is liable for loss or damage from any "unreasonable" deviation in saving
or attempting to save life or property at sea. If deviation is "reasonable," the exemption
remains;[189]
(7) Limitation of damages to 666.67 SDRs per package or two SDRs per kilogram,
whichever is higher. These limits do not apply if a greater value was previously declared
on a contract of carriage;[190]
(8) Contracts of carriage include both negotiable and non-negotiable bills of lading,
whether printed or electronic data interchange (EDI);[ 191]
(9) The definition of"carrier" would encompass both shipowner and charterer, as
well as the contracting carrier and performing carrier;[ 192]
(10) Carriers would be liable from time of receipt to time of delivery of goods;[193]
(11) The definition of"goods" does not exclude cargo by which the contract of
carriage is carried on deck;[194]
(12) Notice of damage or loss can be tendered to the carrier until delivery of the
goods to the person entitled to receipt, or if not apparent, within three days
thereafter;[ 195]
(13) Inclusion of a three-month period for a carrier to bring an indemnification or
contribution claim against another party; and allowing one year to file an arbitration
claim following delivery;[196]
(14) Invalidating any prior covenants providing a choice of foreign forum for
litigation if goods originated or passed through the United States;[197]
(15) There is no liability for delay in delivery of goods.[198]
The MLA proposal attempts to strike a compromise between carrier and shipper
interests. To date, there has been no formal action taken on the MLA's proposal.
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IV. INCONSISTENT POSITIONS OF VARIOUS U.S. SHIPPING
INTERESTS
Although the United States government has signed both the Hague-Visby
Amendments and the Hamburg Rules, neither has been ratified by the United States.[199]
During the mid-I 970's, a dramatic reversal of positions took place between carrier
and shipper interests.[200] Partly out of concern for the evolving Hamburg Rules, the
shipowners and MLA changed their views on Hague-Visby, viewing Visby as a "positive
contribution to international maritime law".[201] Shippers, on the other hand, abandoned
their previously strong support for Hague-Visby and quickly embraced the unfolding
Hamburg Rules.[202] Although the shippers and carriers have completely switched
interests, the controversy continues between the two groups at an almost identical level of
intensity.[203]
Currently, shipowners and cargo underwriters support Visby but not Hamburg, while
shippers largely support Hamburg. In response to this controversy the United States
suggested a potentially acceptable compromise.[204] The compromise, known as the
"trigger approach," was created by the government with the hope that a package
arrangement could be transmitted to the Senate, requesting the Senate's advice and
consent for the ratification of both Visby and Hamburg.[205] Neither side has been
willing to change its position significantly.[206]
The "trigger approach" was first proposed in 1978 in expectation that the Hamburg
Rules would be ratified at a later date.[207] In 1988, the United States Department of
Transportation had sought to achieve a compromise by developing a "trigger
mechanism," whereby the United States would ratify the Visby Protocol immediately and
commit itself to adopting the Hamburg Rules when a substantial proportion of U.S. trade
involved countries enacting Hamburg.[208] To date, the trigger approach has been
unacceptable to a majority of all of the commercial interests.[209] Carriers, carrier
insurers and cargo insurers will not compromise on the Hague-Visby system, and
shippers adamantly oppose Visby unless it leads to Hamburg. The situation creates a
classic stalemate causing governmental inaction until the maritime industry can solve its
own problems.[210]
Nevertheless, the opposing shipping interests have voiced different theories and
arguments on key issues for supporting the particular regimes. The following subsection
discusses the differing opinions on key issues.
A. The Seventeen Defenses
Carriers maintain that the Hague-Visby approach is appropriate, noting that most of
the seventeen defenses are implicitly "retained anyway" in the Hamburg regime.[21 1]
However, carriers feel that Hamburg's rephrasing of multiple defenses into the three
generalized defenses is a giant step backward in legal process. Carriers view Hamburg as
only creating vagueness and inconsistency in the law on their available defenses.[212]
Shippers, in contrast, see the change in Hamburg on these defenses as a positive
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move, and as more properly placing the risks of loss upon the carrier where it is
negligent.[213] In any event, shippers contend, the Hamburg Rules do not really abolish
the entire list of carrier defenses, but rather effectively leave all defenses intact except for
"nautical fault."[214]
While the rhetoric of the respective interests concerning the "17 versus 3 defenses"
debate might sound similar in substance, their ultimate goals for enactment of opposing
legal regimes remain steadfast.
B. Nautical Fault Exemption
Carriers view the exemption of nautical fault as an important device of risk
distribution among insurers in major casualties.[215] It works to spread loss among
numerous underwriters, with little effect on the world's cargo premiums. In any event,
carriers
maintain that the "nautical fault" defense is unimportant in the vast, routine majority
of claims, but potentially important in major casualties such as collisions, strandings or
fires.[216]
In contrast, shippers feel there is no justification for the "nautical fault" defense.[217]
Shippers argue that in the contemporary times of advanced telecommunications, where
shipowners can maintain constant verbal and visual contact with its captains and crews,
the historic rationale of the shipowner's inability to control its vessel at sea no longer
exists.[218] This defense, the shippers maintain, has succeeded in permitting carriers to
evade liability on the high seas. It is an embarrassment to exonerate a carrier based upon
a showing of negligence, and unfair to make the shipper pay for established nautical or
managerial negligence on the part of the carrier and/or its management and agents.[219]
C. Burden of Proof
Carriers maintain that there is not really any shifting of the burden of proof under
Hamburg, other than as a result of vague draftsmanship of the shipowner's defense. It
may be, carriers argue, that the carrier has that heavier onus only due to the burden of
resolving that "vagueness" of the defense.[220]
Shippers feel that existing cargo liability laws unfairly place major risks of loss on
cargo owners, and that Hamburg properly shifts that risk.[221]
D. Delay
Carriers argue that damages for unreasonable delay are nonetheless recoverable under
present law, and that Hamburg merely limits damages for delay.[222] Shippers disagree,
contending that Hamburg properly allows for 2.5 times the freight charges.[223]
E. Package Limitation and Increase In Liability Limits
Carriers maintain that, in the end, all costs fall back upon the shippers of cargo, who
have to pay their own insurance premiums, and ultimately the carrier's premiums and
liabilities, through freight rates.[224] Even though increased recovery limits might be a
gain for individual shippers, it would not be a gain for shippers as a class.[225]
y 
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Regarding the per-package definition, and the effect of containerization, carriers contend
that in the Unites States the law has become substantially settled through litigation.[226]
Shippers believe that higher liability limits should result in a substantial reduction in
their cargo insurance premiurns.[227] It is equitable to shift the risks to shipowners who
have direct control over the degree of protection to cargo in transit.[228] Shippers
contend a specific provision defining "package" is necessary. in view of the
containerization age.[229]
F. Deck Carriage
According to carriers, under existing law, carriage on deck of containerized cargo
provides at least as much protection to shippers as would be provided by the Hamburg
Rules.[230] Responding, shippers maintain that containership operators should not have
to fear that their storage on-deck would not be considered, in accordance with the usage
of the trade.[231]
G. Uniformity of Law and Increased Litigation
Carriers state that the Hamburg Rules are inconsistent, unclear and confusing, and
replacing the Hague Rules will create another half century of litigation to interpret the
new treaty. [232] To the contrary, shippers maintain that the Hamburg Rules will result in
less litigation due to removal of the nautical fault defenses, the introduction of the
"presumed fault" standard, and increased time limits.[233] Extensive litigation is not
required, shippers argue, to determine what the Hamburg standard of liability
means.[234] Comparing the Hamburg standards to those of the Warsaw Convention,
shippers comment that no oppressive litigation or claims payments have been
reported.[235]
H. Economic Implications of the Two Regimes
Carriers maintain that adoption of the Hamburg Rules would necessarily lead to
higher cost, both in the short term and the long run.[236] In contrast, shippers argue that
Hamburg results in lower costs for shippers by eliminating double insurance on the same
risk.[237] But after five years of futile searches for reliable data, the effort to resolve the
economic argument had to be abandoned, as neither economic proposition was provable
to its opposition.[238]
As the conflict was summarized in 1992 by Professor Joseph Sweeney of Fordham
Law School:
Because theoretical positions for or against the alternative solutions
are wedded to economic self-interest we have reached the point where
organized shippers (something hardly possible before changes in the
antitrust law in 1984) and organized carriers (carriers have always been
very effectively organized) are glaring at each other and saying NEVER.
The voice of the insurance industry is also not heard as the voice of
experience but rather the voice of self interest as P&I clubs-responsive to
their shipowner members' concerns-and cargo insurers-forced to justify
their continued existence-have been unable to present a convincing
rationale for doing nothing.[239]
V. ENACTMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
The Hague-Visby Amendments have been adopted by most of the United States'
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trading partners.[240] These include such commercial allies as Australia, Canada, Japan,
Belgium, China. Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom-an estimated 63.9% of U.S.
trade. [241]
Adherents to the Hamburg Rules to date amount to twenty-two nations. These are
generally developing nations with an import-export focus, whose trade is estimated at
less than 2% of total U.S. trade.[242] Shipowning interests often criticize the Hamburg
Rules for being adopted by a minuscule portion of the world's foreign traders, with no
major commercial power adopting the rules.[243] However, as Professor Sturley
comments, the United States action regarding the Hamburg rules could change this
perception because United States' adoption of the Hague Rules was a major factor in their
gaining wide-spread international acceptance.[244]
Some U.S. trading partners have compromised with variations of the "trigger
approach," ratifying Hague-Visby immediately and adopting the Hamburg Rules at a
later time. For example, Australia has enacted its Carriage of Goods by Sea Bill of 1991
under which the Visby Amendments were ratified immediately, with automatic adoption
of the Hamburg Rules in three years.[245]
In 1993, Canada enacted its Carriage of Goods by Water Act, implementing the 1968
Visby Amendments and the 1979 Special Drawing Rights Protocol immediately. [246]
The law also includes provisions for future adoption of the 1978 Hamburg Rules.[247]
The Act will require the Minister of Transport to conduct a review within five years to
determine whether the Hague Visby Rules should be replaced by the Hamburg Rules.
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Thus the Act allows Canada to implement new liability rules as Canada's trading partners
adopt these conventions. The Minister referred to this Act as "a staged approach with
respect to the two international conventions."[248] Canada naturally would like to move
in concert with the United States because the United States is Canada's second largest
trading partner in terms of waterborne trade. [249]
Most recent enactments of Hague-Visby by other countries have included custom-
tailoring in the domestic legislation.[250] Some state have adopted, and other states are
adopting, laws that combine elements from the Hague regime and the Hamburg Rules.
These "tailored" laws, however, combine the two regimes but do not follow a uniform
approach.[251]
New Zealand, the most recent Hague-Visby adherent, took such liberties, including a
particularly well-drafted definition of the carrier that may fit in well with U.S.
efforts.[252] Korea also took liberties with Hague-Visby.[253]
A. The Scandinavian Maritime Codes
In the most radical departure to date, the Scandinavian countries have incorporated
much of the Hamburg Rules in their version of Hague-Visby.[254] Even the
Scandinavian countries, with their long history of supporting international uniformity in
this field, have adopted legislation effective October 1, 1994 that strikes a compromise
between Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules.[255]
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark believe that the Hamburg Rules look to the
future, and are implementing as much of the Hamburg Rules in the new legislation as is
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allowed by Hague-Visby.[256] The legislation is expected to give rise to many conflicts
and much uncertainty in the industry.[257] The major changes in the new Scandinavian
codes include the following:
(1) The "tackle-to-tackle" principle of Hague-Visby is abandoned.[258] The carrier
will no longer be allowed to exclude liability for damage to or loss of the goods occurring
at the loading port, before the goods pass the ship's rail, or at the unloading port after
passing of the rail. The carrier will be liable for the load as long as it is in charge of the
goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of discharge. In other
words, the Scandinavian countries have adopted the compulsory period of responsibility
of the Hamburg Rules, which cannot be contracted out of [259]
(2) The Scandinavian countries also give up the catalogue of defenses available to the
carrier in the Hague-Visby Rules.[260] Instead, the carrier must prove that its servants
and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage in
order for the carrier to avoid liability for damage to the goods whilst they were in its
charge.[261] This rule has also been picked from the Hamburg Rules, but unlike the
Hamburg Rules, the Scandinavian countries will continue to keep the carrier's defenses in
respect of fire and navigational mismanagement of the ship.[262]
(3) The carrier can no longer exclude liability for damage of or loss to live
animals.[263]
(4) The carrier will no longer be allowed to exclude liability for loss of or damage to
deck cargo, and cargo may only be carried on deck under very special circumstances. If
the carrier carries a cargo on deck in breach of an express agreement with the shipper to
carry it below deck, the carrier will lose its right to limit its liability.[264]
(5) The new Codes maintain the limitation amounts of the Hague-Visby Rules for
damage to or loss of the goods. The carrier may limit its liability to 2 SDR per kilogram
of the goods or to 667.67 SDR per package, whichever is the higher amount.[265]
(6) The Scandinavian Codes also adopt the jurisdiction and arbitration provisions of
the Hamburg Rules, ensuring a plaintiff that it can always commence proceedings in a
minimum number of places: (a) where the defendant has its principal place of business;
(b) where the transport agreement was entered into; or (c) where the goods were taken
over or delivered by the carrier.[266]
B. The Chinese Maritime Code
The People's Republic of China has also enacted legislation which combines
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characteristics of both Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules.[267] Attempting to follow
those principles recognized internationally in the shipping world in its 1993 Maritime
Code, China primarily tailored carriers' main responsibilities upon the Hague-Visby
Rules, but also adopted significant portions of the Hamburg Rules.[268] The significant
provisions of the new Chinese act are as follows:
(1) The law adopts the Hamburg definitions of"carrier," to include both contracting
carrier and the actual carrier;[269]
(2) Modified from the Hamburg Rules, the carrier has responsibility over goods in
containers from time of receiving the goods at port, until time of delivery at the port of
discharge. With non-container goods, the carrier is responsible from the time of loading
until the time of unloading, derived from Hague-Visbv.[270]
(3) The carrier is liable to the shipper for delay as per Hamburg, but damages are
limited to the (actual) freight payable for the goods delayed.[271] (The Chinese
enactment does not provide the 2 1/2 times enhancement factor as in Article 6(1)(b) of
the Hamburg Rules);
(4) Following the SDR Protocol of Hague-Visby, the carriers' liability for loss or
damage to goods is 666.67 SDRs, or 2 units of account per kilogram, whichever is
higher.[272]
(5) Twelve (12) defenses to carrier liability are maintained in the new Chinese code,
derived from the 17 exceptions of the Hague Rules. Notwithstanding, as provided in the.
Hamburg Rules, the carrier shall bear the burden of proof for these defenses.[273]
(6) The carrier is liable for loss or damage to deck cargo, unless the shipper had
contractually agreed to deck carriage beforehand. This provision is derived from Article
9 of Hamburg.[274]
VI. WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PURSUE FOR A NEW
LEGAL REGIME?
Though having served shipping and international trade well for years, the
Hague/COGSA regime is now substantially outdated.[275] It was designed for marine
transportation existing before the late 1920s, and is unsuitable for entry into the twenty-
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first century.[276] The original drafters of the Hague Rules could not have possibly
anticipated the electronic data revolution, advanced satellite telecommunications, the
containerization age, the elimination or reduction of most tariffs on trade, the world's
emergence into a global economy with GATT and NAFTA, or the proliferation of
international ocean transport of goods.
The United States can no longer proceed under an outmoded legal system for liability
determination. Shipper and carrier interests, by necessity, must be prepared to make
compromises for this purpose. With the significant growth of ocean shipping as
discussed above, an increase of cargo claims and litigation will be handled within an
ancient system that is unprepared to efficiently, fairly and effectively resolve these
disputes.
Despite an abundance of theories from all concerned commercial interests expressing
many different scenarios and points of view, the current legal and judicial framework
cannot properly deal with ever-increasing cargo damage disputes. Fault, or lack of it, is
often factually difficult to establish. Once effective legal guidelines are clearly
established, there should be less occasions for litigation. It is extremely difficult,
expensive and time consuming to litigate or arbitrate disputed facts and legal issues,
especially under antiquated laws that do not take into account many of the key
developments in contemporary ocean shipping.
Due to the strongly opposing sentiments of carrier and shipper interests, it is doubtful
that Congress will ever have the impetus to enact either the Hague-Visby or the Hamburg
regime. Nevertheless, all shipping interests agree that devising a new legal regime is
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essential.
What type of liability scheme would be fair, realistic and serve the better long-term
interests of American society? In this regard, there is no reason why the United States is
constrained to rigidly adopt either Hague-Visby or the Hamburg Rules in toto, without
exploring combinations, compromises and other alternatives. If substantive variations of
these rules are contemplated, it would be necessary for the United States to denounce the
particular compact being revised.[277] In addressing these issues, various policy factors
should be considered.
A. World Uniformity
It would serve the future international trade community to promote a new legal
regime upon the framework of the Hague-Visby Amendment with its SDR Protocol. As
most of the industrialized world and trading nations have gravitated towards Hague-
Visby, there are strong considerations for proceeding in that direction. However, the
Hamburg Rules have some attractive attributes as well. The Scandinavian countries and
China seem to have reached an equitable balancing of interests between carriers and
shippers.
B. Strong U.S. Flag Fleet
National merchant fleets not only contribute to the prestige of countries that sponsor
them, but are also viewed as essential to protecting national security and guaranteeing
unimpeded access to international markets on reasonable terms. A distinguishing feature
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of the ocean shipping industry is the over-arching presence of government intervention to
support national fleets.[278] A basic goal of the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 is to preserve
and encourage the development of an economically sound and efficient U.S. flag-liner
fleet capable of meeting national security needs.[279] In 1992 U.S. Representative
Walter Jones had expressed his view that there are many policy problems facing the U.S.
maritime industry; he perceived many of them as exacerbated by wrong governmental
policies.[280]
An important factor that must be considered is the survival of the U.S. flag fleet.
However, for different reasons, the U.S. flag fleet has experienced a marked decrease in
the number of American-flagged carriers since 1984. Regrettably, this trend is
continuing. [281]
In response to 1992 reports that two of our largest liner companies would leave the
U.S. flag and possibly change their corporate status by 1995, U.S. Representative Robert
W. Davis noted that the liners' decision would be based upon many factors-but
principally center around their need to be competitive in the world market.[282] He
stressed the importance of a continued and significant presence of a U.S. flagged, U.S.
owned and U.S. crewed liner operation. Even the shippers, Congressman Davis
maintained, would regret the day when no U.S. carriers were at the table. To prevent the
loss of our U.S. flag fleet, he suggested that we revisit regulatory and economic
approaches and maintain a delicate balance between the carriers and shippers.[283]
On this note, a strict Hamburg regime, expected to "provide for an increase in carrier
liability,"[284] would not be a source of encouragement for a U.S. flag fleet. It is in the
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better national interests for the United States to pursue a more balanced approach to risk
allocation.
C. Compromise On The "Nautical Fault" Defense
Undoubtedly one of the major sources of controversy between shippers and carriers is
the "nautical fault" defense, effectively exonerating shipowners from the negligence of
their captains and crew in the navigation and management of the ship. The nautical fault
defense is at odds with traditional American tort concepts, as well as the liability laws
governing the trucking and railroad companies.
As Roger Wigen testified in 1992 before the House Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine, on behalf of the National Industrial Transportation League (a shipper's
organization):
The world has changed a great deal since the Hague Rules were
adopted in 1924. Wooden ships have given way to highly automated steel
ships. Marconi's wireless has been replaced with satellite
communications. Gangs of longshoremen lifting loads of breakbulk cargo
have yielded to conga lines of intermodal containers hoisted aboard ships
by cranes. Isolated national economics now compete fiercely in global
commerce. However, the laws governing international maritime cargo
liability have failed to keep pace. They are tied to a philosophy which
believes a carrier has no liability for cargo once a seaworthy ship leaves
port, even if the captain and/or crew are guilty of negligence. These laws
accept the premise that once at sea, the carrier has no control over its
captain and crew. While this may have been true in the first third of the
century, it certainly is not true today. Telecommunications advances
allow a maritime liner carrier to have as much control over its crew as do
trucking and railroad companies.[285]
The "nautical fault" defense should be revised, as its historic rationale has been
virtually eliminated and the exemption is inconsistent with modern tort liability concepts.
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The shipowner's non-control over his vessel, captain and crew while out at sea has
diminished. Satellite telecommunications and other advanced technologies enable the
shipowner to continuously monitor and control the operation of his vessels through
regular verbal, visual and radar communications.
As there may be certain situations in which the historic rationale for the nautical fault
defense would still be applicable, a fair and logical compromise might be reached on this
issue. Circumstances may exist where the shipowner is unable to exercise reasonable
control over his vessel, captain and crew, or where the shipowner was unaware of facts
and circumstances leading to the negligence of his captain and crew in their operation and
management of the vessel. For example, evidence showing an unexpected technical
break in communications preventing conveyance of a shipowner's directions to his
captain or crew, or a shipowner's lack of knowledge of their negligent propensities due to
concealment, might suffice to establish the defense.
Thus, rather than maintain a complete exemption, a qualified nautical fault defense
would be equitable to both sides of the debate, yet still retain the nautical faults
traditional rationale. The shipowner should have the burden of presenting evidence to
establish his lack of control or lack of knowledge of facts under these circumstances.
Section 1304(2)(a) of COGSA might be revised as follows to effect this compromise:
(2) Neither the carriers nor their ship shall be responsible for loss of
damage arising or resulting from-
(a) Act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants
of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, if the
shipowner could not reasonably control such conduct of the carrier's
master, mariner, pilot or servants, or the shipowner did not know and
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could not have reasonably known of facts and circumstances leading to
such act. neglect or default of the carrier's master, mariner, pilot or
servants.[286]
D. An Effective & Economical Loss Compensation System
The interests of a commercial society are better advanced with a strong first-party
claims resolution system, primarily reliant on cargo damage coverage. Once damage to
freight is shown to be a covered loss, a shipper's own cargo insurer will routinely
investigate and evaluate the claim and promptly compensating the shipper. It can be
expected to be a relatively quick process. A cargo insurer can always pursue
contribution, indemnification and/or subrogation against any other responsible party,
including the carrier. Hague-Visby seems to allocate the greater risks of loss upon the
shipper, essentially furthering a strong first-party indemnity system. In contrast, the
Hamburg Rules create a new regime of third party rights and remedies against the carrier,
shifting somewhat to a third-party recovery process.
Despite the shift of risk in the Hamburg Rules favoring shippers, it is the shipper that
may ultimately pay for the loss. Even if the Hamburg Rules are adopted in the United
States, there would not be elimination of the need for cargo damage insurance for the
shipper.
Cargo insurance, unlike shipowners' protection and indemnity insurance, is a form of
property insurance ordinarily paid promptly on proof of loss, without regard to liabilities
which may be the subject of later disputed claims. This feature in itself is of great value
to cargo owners, who are unlikely to give it up for the privilege of pursuing third-party
claims dependent the proof of liability under new, unclear and controversial rules, with a
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new network of claims agents responsible mainly to foreign protection and indemnity
underwriters.[287]
In any event, a maritime attorney expressed a view not long ago that "the whole issue
is a red herring, because no matter who buys coverage, shippers end up paying the
premium. Increasing liability may be shrewd public relations [for the carrier], but it is an
essentially meaningless gesture . . . because increased premiums will eventually be
passed along to the shipper."[288] According to that maritime attorney, the party in the
best position to purchase cargo insurance is the shipper, because only the shipper has
certain knowledge of what is being shipped.[289] Thus, it might be that shippers and
carriers really have little in substance to argue about anyway.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States is the world's largest trading nation, with international trade
approaching almost S1 trillion annually. The importance of ocean transportation to U.S.
foreign trade is great, as approximately half of that trade consists of cargo carried by liner
vessels.
The emergence of the United States into the global economy of the 21st century with
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achieve its goal of prompt and efficient assessments." 99 The Rule also promotes the active
and early participation of responsible parties.120 The trustee, however, has the discretion
to determine the extent of the parties' involvement and the timing of the invitation to
become involved, provided the responsible party is invited to participate before the
trustee delivers the Notice of Intent. 121 To determine the extent of responsible party
participation, the trustee must consider such factors as the identity of the responsible
party, the willingness of the responsible party to participate, the willingness of the
responsible party to fund the restoration, and the degree of responsible party
cooperation. 122
Responsible party participation was the subject of extensive public comment. 123 Some
commenters supported the provisions requiring responsible party coordination as a means
to reduce litigation and facilitate cost restoration plans."1 4 These commenters originally
urged NOAA to make the Rule more explicit in its definition of the trustee's ability to
limit participation and dismiss responsible parties hindering the assessment process. 125
One commenter urged NOAA to include a mediation provision in the Rule to prevent
trustees from arbitrarily dismissing responsible parties because of procedural
119 61 Federal Resister at 449.
:20 Id. at 500 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.14(c)): see also Id. at 443.
121 61 Federal Register at 500.
12 'd. at 501 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.14(c)(5)).
123 See Comments of the Chevron Corporation. NOAA Comment No. 15 (Sept. 28. 1995) [hereinafter
NOAA Comment No. 151: Comments of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, NOAA
Comment No. 3 2 (Oct. 2. 1995) [hereinafter NOAA Comment No. 3 21: Cormnents of the Association
of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, NOAA Comment No. 46 (Sept. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter NOAA Comment No. 461; Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council, NOAA
Comment No. 61 (Oct. 2. 1995) [hereinafter NOAA Comment No. 6 11.
124 See NOAA Comment No. 46. supra note 54; NOAA Comment No. 6 1. supra note 54.
125 Id.
e
assessments.126 in response, the drafters included a specific provision to allow trustees to
terminate responsible party participation. 127
Other commenters strongly urged the deletion of the requirement that trustees invite
responsible party participation. "8 These commenters suggested that the invitation to
participate should be left to the trustee's discretion to avoid any conflicts of interest
caused by responsible party participation in the restoration process and the duty of those
parties to protect their finances and stockholder investments.' 29 In response, NOAA
reiterated its position that responsible party involvement is essential to achieve
expeditious and cost-effective assessments and restoration. 130 NOAA maintains that
broad trustee discretion to terminate responsible party involvement will protect the
integrity of the restoration process, by facilitating cooperation among all the affected
parties and providing a neutral referee to oversee assessments.131
IV. 1.1.41.. The Restoration Planning Phase
Once the trustee invites the responsible parties to participate, the process enters the
Restoration Planning Phase.' 32 Upon entering this phase, the trustee must determine
whether an injury has resulted from the incident.13 3 To do so, the trustee must evaluate
whether: (1) the definition of injury has been met;' 34 and (2) either an injured natural
1'6 See NOAA Comment No. 15. supra note 54.
1:7 612 Federal Register at 501 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.14(c)(4)).
1'8 See NOAA Comment No. 32. supra note 54.
129 Id.
130 61 Federal Register at 461.
131 id.
132 See id. at 506-08 (to be codified at 15 CFR s.s. 990.50-.56)).
13 3 Id. at 506 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.5 1 (a)).
134 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.5 1 (b)(1)).
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resource has been exposed to the discharged oil and a pathway' 35 can be established, or
an injury or impairment of a natural resource service occurred as a result of a discharge of
oil or a response action.' 36 These terms encompass direct and indirect effects on natural
resources and services to provide permanent and effective restorative remedies.' 37
When selecting potential injuries to assess, the trustee should consider a number of
factors including: (1) the natural resources and services involved ;138 (2) the types of
evaluation procedures available and their costs;' 39 (3) the evidence indicating
exposure; 140 (4) the inspection of the pathway from the incident to the resource;' 4 1 (5)
evidence of adverse changes or impairments constituting an injury;142 (6) the manner in
which the injury occurred; 14 3 (7) the degree and extent of the exposure; 144 (8) the
potential natural recovery period;'145 and (9) the available methods of restoration. 146
Although the trustee may use different procedures to measure the extent of any injuries,
the trustee must still evaluate the degree of the injury, the total volume or area of the
injury, the duration of the injury or adverse effect, and the vulnerability of the affected
35 Id. at 506 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.5 l(b)(2)(i)). A "pathway" is "any link that connects the
incident to a natural resource. or service. or both, and is associated with an actual discharge of oil." Id. At
504 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.30(d)).
136 61 Federal Register at 506 (to be codified at CFR s. 990.5 1 (b)(2)(ii).
137 See Id. At 440.
138 Id. at 506 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. s. 990.5 1 (f(1)).
139 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.5 1 (f)(2)).
' Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.51(f)(3)).
141 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.5 1 (f)(4)).
142 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.5 1 (0(5)).
'
43 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.51(f)(7)).
144 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.5 1 (0(8)).
45 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.51(0(9)). Natural recovery is defined as a "restoration alternative
whereby injured natural resources and services are allowed to return to conditions prior to the incident
without human intervention. .. " Id. at 452.
146 61 Federal Register at 506 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.51(f)(10)).
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natural resource or service before implementing an assessment plan.' 47 The trustee must
then identify a reasonable range of restoration alternatives, evaluate the alternatives and
select the most appropriate one, and produce a Final Restoration Plan, provided the
gathered information indicates that restoration efforts are necessary. 14
The "reasonable range" of restoration alternatives encompasses primary or
compensatory restorative elements that address the specific injuries caused by an
incident. 149 Primary restoration 50 ranges from natural recovery, which requires no
human intervention, to aggressive intervention to return the natural resources and services
to their pre-injury state with greater speed or certainty than natural recovery."
Compensatory restoration, including actions taken to provide services of the same type
and quality as those injured,' 2 refers to compensation for the interim losses of the natural
resources or services from the occurrence of the incident until restoration is complete.153
Each alternative considered must satisfy the goal of making the environment and the
public whole for any injuries suffered as a result of oil discharge.' 54
The trustee must scale both the primary and compensatory restoration alternatives to
avoid a double recovery and to ensure that any injuries are adequately compensated.'15
The trustee must determine the appropriate scaling approach needed to restore or
rehabilitate a resource or service by considering the area of the habitat contaminated, the
'4 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.5 1 (c)(1), (2)).
148 Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(a)(1), (2)).
1'9 Id.
1 Primary restorations include any actions taken to return the injured natural resources and services to the
condition that would have existed had the injury not occurred. 61 Federal Resister at 505 (to be codified
at 15 CFR s. 990.30).
151 See 61 Federal Register at 507 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(b)).
"5Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(c)(1), (2).
'
53 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(c)(2)).
154 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(a)(1), (2)).
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cost of lost ecological services and the estimated volume of the loss.'5 6
One such approach is the resource-to-resource and service-to-service approach.157
Under this approach, the trustee determines what action will provide natural resources or
services in the same quantity, quality, and type as those lost or injured.' If this approach
is inappropriate, the trustee may use the valuation scaling approach, whereby the trustee
measures the value of the injured resources or services and determines the amount that
must be restored to provide the same value of resources or services lost to the public from
the oil discharge, or threat thereof' 9 Once the trustee develops feasible restoration
alternatives, he or she must evaluate each alternative and select the most appropriate one
based on: (1) the cost to carry out the alternative; 60 (2) the extent to which the alternative
meets the trustee's goals and objectives for restoration;'61 (3) the alternative's likelihood
of success;' 62 (4) the extent to which the alternative will prevent further and future
injury;' 63 (5) the amount of resources and services that benefit from the alternative; 164 (6)
the effect on public health and safety.' 65 The trustee must then develop a Draft Final
Restoration Plan that includes: (1) a summary of the injury assessment procedures;' 66 (2)
a description of the nature, degree, and extent of the injuries resulting from the
'ss Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(d)).
156 Id.
157 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.53(dX2)).
s58 Id
159 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.5 3 (dX3Xi)).
60 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.54(aX1)).
'
61Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.54(aX2)).
16 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.54(aX3)).
163 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.54(aX4)).
163 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.54(aX5)).
165 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.54(aX6)).
166 Id. at 508 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(bX1Xi)).
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incident; " (3) the goals and objectives of the restoration; 6 8 (4) the range of relevant
alternative restoration plans and a description of the procedures used to evaluate them; 169
(5) the identification of the preferred alternative and a description of the involvement of
the responsible party in the selection process;' 70 and (6) a proposal to monitor the
restoration plan, including a set of criteria that will be used to determine the effectiveness
of the plan."' The trustee must make the Draft Final Restoration Plan available for public
comment. 172 The trustee's Final Restoration Plan must include responses to the public
comments and any modifications made to the Plan as a result of those comments.' 73
V7.1.1.1.5. The Restoration 1mplementation Phase
After the Final Restoration Plan has been developed, the restoration process enters the
Restoration Implementation Phase."74 The trustee must present a written demand to the
responsible parties."' The demand must request responsible party implementation of the
restoration plan, subject to trustee oversight, and must request either an advance of the
trustee's assessment costs or an advance of a specific sum representing the trustee's
assessments costs and any restoration implementation Costs. 76 The demand notice must
also identify the incident, the trustee, the relevant injuries, the index of the administrative
record, the Final Restoration Plan or Notice of Intent, and the request for the
16- Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(b)(1)(ii)).
16 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(b)(1)(iii)).
169 1d. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(b)(1)(iv)).
170 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(b)(1)(v), (vi)).
" Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(b)(1)(Nii)).
'
7 2 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(a)).
"
3 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.55(d)).
174 Id. at 508-10 (to be codified at 15 CFR s.s. 990.60-.66)
'
75 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.62(a)).
'
7 6 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.62(b)).
~"- U.
reimbursement of assessment costs and interest on these Costs."7 If the responsible party
does not agree to the demand in writing within ninety days, the trustee may file a judicial
action for damages, costs, and contribution in the appropriate United States District Court
within three years of the publication of the Final Restoration Plan." 78 If the responsible
party is unable to fund the restoration, the trustee may also seek a disbursement from the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.' 79 Any sum the trustee recovers in satisfaction of a
damage claim must be placed in a trust account and used as the restoration process
continues.'o Trustees are permitted to use any sums recovered for assessment costs to
reimburse them for their expenses.'81
IV 1. 1. 1. 6. Summniary
Under this Rule, the Restoration Implementation Phase should not be an adversarial
or time-consuming process. As indicated by the strong preference for responsible party
coordination and participation, the restoration alternatives will ideally have been
approved by all parties concerned. The Rule also encourages public comments and
participation, either at the time of the issuance of the Notice of Intent or at any other time
the trustee determines is appropriate.'182 This Rule should ensure cost-effective and timely
restoration of natural resources and services. 18 3
Court practice should follow the standard contemplated by Congress in drafting the
OPA, i.e., the cost of restoration and replacement plus the diminution in value of natural
'
77 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.62(e)).
I'8 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.64(a), (b)).
179 OPA s. 10122(a)(2), 33 USC s. 2712(a)(2) (1994).
80o 61 Federal Resister at 509 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.65(a)).
181 Id. (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.65(a)).
182 Id. at 501 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990.14(d)).
resources until they are restored.' 8 4 The regulations promulgated by the Department of
Interior pursuant to the CERCLA (see Part IV. 1.2.2. infra) will also have an impact on
the measurement of natural resources damages under the OPA 15 I think the ongoing
Exxon Valdez litigation will, hopefully, also elucidate the legal situation. In this
litigation, both the state of Alaska and a number of environmental groups have sued for
natural resources damages and restoration. 186 Before awarding damages, it will be
necessary for the courts to arrive at a methodology for the evaluation of the harmed
resources.187
When dealing with natural resources damages under the OPA it is also interesting to
compare the solutions adopted in the international conventions on oil pollution liability,
the 1969 CLC and 1971 FC with amending Protocols of 1984. The present (unamended)
definition of"pollution damage" in the CLC (for the text, see Part III.1.1.2. supra) does
183 Id. at 500 (to be codified at 15 CFR s. 990. 10)).
184 See the preceding n. See also A.F. Bessemer Clark, (1991) 2 LMCLQ p. 248 f. Regarding the
"diminution of value" measurcmnent see State of Ohio v. US. Dept. of the Interior. 880 F 2d 432 (1989)
p. 475. ff.
185 According to Federal Register. Vol. 57. No. 50. Friday. March 13. 1992. Proposed Rules p. 8965 the
natural resource damage assessment procedures promulgated by the Department of the Interior (DOI)
"are the current standard for all damage assessments (both oil and hazardous substances) until the
procedures in this rulemaking process are developed specifically for oil. After the OPA regulations are
promulgated, the 43 CFR part 11 procedures will still be used to assess damages for natural resource
injuries resulting from a release of a hazardous substance." Although the OPA rulemaking effort is
separate and distinct from the existing regulation, the procedures identified in 43 CFR part 11 provide a
solid base from which to identify assessment procedures to be promulgated under OPA. Further, the
NOAA and DOI are coordinating their respective rulemakings to ensure consistency, when practicable,
for the trustees and responsible parties in conducting natural resource damage assessments as a result of
either a discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance. Ibld. p. 8965.
186 The environmental groups are using common law, state law. and citizens'-suit provisions in federal
statutes as the legal basis for their actions. See S. Keeva, ABA Journal. February 1991, p. 68.
187 According to S. Keeva. ABA Journal. February 1991 p. 68. 'Observers say that the natural-resources
valuations are likely to use some variation of a contingency valuation approach, a method that attempts to
quantify what was lost as a result of the spill. Such an approach assigns not only 'use' values to damaged
resources, as when a fishcnuran can no longer pursue his trade because of damage to fisheries, but also
so-called 'existence' values. The latter would seek to quantify, for example, how much it is worth to a
person in Miami or Chicago just to know that a place like Prince William Sound exists, even if he or she
may never go there."
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not give any indication as to whether damage to the environment as such is compensable.
As is the case with compensation for pure economic losses, this question therefore has to
be decided by national courts on the basis of national law. However, most countries lack
provisions or court decisions dealing with this matter. Further, it may be noted that the
IOPC Fund does not accept claims for non-economic environmental damage.' 8
The new definition of "pollution damage" (1984 Protocols, see Part 1II. 1.1.2. supra)
seems to make it clear that claims for damage to the marine environment as such are not
admissible. However, the costs incurred in restoring the environment after a pollution
incident ("costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be
undertaken") are compensable. The new definition excludes compensation based on a
theoretical calculation of damage caused to the environment by oil without actual proof
of the costs of reinstatement. Speculative costs are not covered.'8 9 Finally, it should be
noted that only costs for reasonable measures of reinstatement are recoverable.
As the wording of compensable damage to natural resources in s. 2702 (b)(2)(A) of
the OPA is not so restricted as the definition of"pollution damage" in the conventions, it
will indeed be interesting to see how the U.S. courts interpret the OPA. Will e.g., claims
for non-economic environmental damage be accepted? And if "pure environmental
88 In 1980 the IOPC Fund's Assembly adopted a Resolution on the admissibility of claims of this kind. In
the Resolution it was stated that the assessment of compensation "...is not to be made on the basis of an
abstract quantification of damage calculated in accordance %with theoretical models." This means that
compensation can be paid by the IOPC Fund only if a claimant who has a legal right to claim under
national law has suffered quantifiable economic loss. M. Jacobsson & N. Trotz, Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1986 p. 481.
189 It may be mentioned that the Supplement to TOVALOP (Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement
concerning Liability for Oil Pollution) also covers reasonable costs actually incurred in reasonable
measures to restore or replace damaged natural resources, but it does not cover theoretical or speculative
damage. See about the TOVALOP and CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution) systems e.g., P. Wetterstein, o. cit. p. 143 f. with references.
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damage" is recoverable, how far will such recovery extend? (Cf also Part IV. 1.2.2.
infra).190
As a concluding remark one can say that the increased liability for vessel
owners/operators combined with the obligation to establish and maintain evidence of
financial responsibility, the broad writing of compensable damage to natural resources
and the increased funding through the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund have significantly
enhanced the possibilities of OPA being an effective tool in restoring devastated areas. 191
IV.1.1.2. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
As mentioned earlier in the section dealing with pure economic losses (Part
III.1.1.3.1. supra) the TAPAA provides liability for "all damages, including cleanup
costs, sustained by any person or entity, public or private, including residents of Canada,
as a result of discharges of oil from such vessel" (s. 1653 (c)(1)). This broad and
unspecified writing was partly clarified by the 1990 amendments to TAPAA (Pub.L. 101-
380). The wording of the added par. (13) to s. 1653 (c) covers "the net loss of taxes,
revenues, fees, royalties, rents, or other revenues incurred by a State or a political
subdivision of a State due to injury, destruction, or loss of...or natural resources."
Although these are consequential losses of a special type the added par. could be read to
indicate a broader TAPAA-coverage of natural resources damages (cf. the opening
190 I think it is interesting to note that several commentators in Federal Register. Vol. 57, No. 50, Friday,
March 13, 1992, Proposed Rules p. 8977 expressed the view "'that regardless of procedures chosen, OPA
requires that the measure of damages must be based upon restoration costs plus use and nonuse values
plus reasonable assessment costs." Other commentators represented a different view, indicating "that
since injuries as a result of oil spills are short-term, damages should be based upon restoration costs and
lost use values alone....since nonuse values cannot be accurately detennined, their use in a model or
compensation formula may produce recoveries far in excess of what is needed to restore the
environment. Therefore, nonuse values should not be required by OPA."
191 See also M. J. Uda, Virginia Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10. 1991 p. 432.
-
~~- -~-~~~--
sentence of par. (13): "For any claims against the Fund, the term "damages" shall
include, but not be limited to-"and the notion "all damages" in s. 1653 (c)(1).
Generally, the TAPAA seems to have been interpreted by commentators to provide
recovery for damages to natural resources. 192 But the statute has also been read more
narrowly, i.e., covering in the main actual cleanup costs plus economic losses-not
making whole the environment itself.193 Also in this respect the ongoing Exxon Valdez
litigation may clarify many questions: the right to assert claims for natural resources
damages, 194 the extent and type of damages recoverable, etc. (cf. the discussion supra
concerning compensation for damage to natural resources under the OPA). However, it
is to be noted that claims for compensation may be cut by the provisions limiting liability
under the TAPAA (see Part III. 1.1.3.1. supra).
IV.1.2. Danmage from hazardous substances
IV.1.2.1. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Before 1977 the FWPCA s. 1321 (f) included only cleanup cost liability. with the
1977 amendments a new subs. (4) was added which expanded the liability to include
"any costs or expenses incurred by the Federal Government or any State government in
192 See e.g., J. Gallagher, New England Law Review. Vol 25. Winter. 1990 p. 579 ff.; J. J. Uda, Virginia
Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, 1991, p. 411; A. Rest & R. Leineinann, Environmental Liability
Law Review, 1/1990 p. 18, 21 and T. J. Schoenbaum, The forum, Vol. 20, 1984 p. 158. Cf. also the
wording of s. 1653 (a)(1): the holder of the pipeline right-of-way "shall be strictly liable to all damaged
parties, public or private, without regard to fault for such damages. and without regard to ownership of
any affected lands. structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon by Alaska
Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or economic purposes." See also Jordan v.
Anmerada Hess Corp., 479 F Supp 573 (1979): provisions of TAPAA were designed to establish the
permit holders of the pipeline right-of-way as strictly liable for a broad range of damage to the land, fish,
wildlife, air, water, and the subsistence lifestyle of the Alaskan Native.
193 See B. Breen. Wake Forest Law Review, Vol 24, 1989 p. 855.
194 Section 1653 (c)(1) seems to be written so that both the government and private victims have the
possibility of presenting a claim for compensation.
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the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of a
discharge of oil or a hazardous substance in violation of subsection (b) of this section."
But the term "natural resources" was left undefined by the FWPCA and thus open to
dispute.1 95 Further, also here we meet the evaluation problems mentioned above, i.e.,
how shall costs for restoration or replacement of damaged natural resources be measured
in concrete terms?' 96 However, the Department of Interior's regulations governing the
assessment of damages for natural resource injuries resulting from releases of hazardous
substances (see Part IV. 1.2.2. infra) are also applicable in the case of FWPCA releases.197
Opinions have been expressed that the 1977 amendments also expanded the right to
bring actions under the FWPCA. While originally only the federal government could sue
for actual cleanup costs, the FWPCA now allowed authorized representatives of states to
serve as trustees for natural resources and bring lawsuits as well.' 98 But also in the case
of the FWPCA the provisions on limitation of liability (see Part III. .1.1. supra) might be
an obstacle to full recovery of costs for the restoration of a substantially damaged
ecosystem. However, as has been pointed out before, the practical usefulness of the
FWPCA has significantly decreased with the enactment of CERCLA (infra).
19s See also M. J. Uda. Virginia Environmental Law Journal. Vol. 10, 1991 p. 430.
196 Cf. also the Comnmonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Coloconroni, 456 F Supp 1327 (1978), 628 F 2d
652 (1980).
197 State of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. ofthe Interior, 880 F 2d 432 (1989) p. 439.
'1- See In reAllied Towing Corp., 478 F Supp 398 (1979). 33 USC s. 1321 (f)(5) reads: "The President, or
the authorized representative of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of the natural
resources to recover for the costs of replacing or restoring such resources. Sums recovered shall be used
to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of
the Federal Government, or the State Government." However, it may be mentioned that the district court
held in Complaint ofBallard Shipping Co. 772 F Supp 721 (1991), that 33 USC s. 1321 does not give
individual states a cause of action.
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IV.1.2.2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980
The enactment of CERCLA was a milestone for the expanded scope of Congress'
application of the natural resource damages concept. The CERCLA program has had a
far-reaching impact, dominating environmental law throughout the 1980s. The relevant
provisions of CERCLA provide that responsible parties may be held liable for "damages
for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release." 99 The term
"natural resources" means "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking
water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by,
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States..., any State or local
government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe...".200 The omission of a statutory
definition for natural resource injury or damages in CERCLA has caused a great deal of
controversy. I will deal with it later in this thesis.
The writing of s. 9601 (16) also raises the issue whether the text limits the availability
of natural resource damages to cases where the resources harmed (land, fish, wildlife,
water, etc.) are owned by federal, state, local or foreign governments, rather than by
private parties. In State of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 880 F 2d 432 (1989) the
Interior's regulations (see more infra) had taken the position that damage to privately-
'99 42 USC s. 9607 (a)(4)(C). For assessment costs liability see e.g.. Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated
Transport Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1869. It may also be mentioned that s. 9607 (j) creates "federally
permitted release" defense in actions for response costs or natural resource damages. Further, s. 9607
(d)(1) specifically exempts recovery (from a non-negligent person) for any damages occurring as a result
of any actions taken or omitted in accordance wvith the National Contingency Plan. On these defenses see
e.g., A. J. Simons & J. M. Wicks. Natural Resources Damages under CERCLA: Here They Come,
Ready of Not, St. John's Law Review. Vol. 63, 1989 p. 816 f.
200 S. 9601 (16).
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owned natural resources was not to be included in natural resource damage assessments.
The Court of Appeals remanded this issue for the Department to clarify its position. The
Court stated, inter alia,:
"It should be noted. howevcr. that while the statute excludes purcly private resources. it
clearly does not limit the definition of 'natural resources' to resources owned by a
government. If that were the meaning of § 101 (16). then all tile phrases other than
'belonging to' would be surplusage. If the words 'managed by. held in trust by.
appertaining to. or othenrwise controlled by' mean anything at all, they must refer to
certain types of governmecntal (federal. state or local) interests in privately-owned
property....The legislative history of CERCLA further illustrates that damage to private
property-absent any government involvement management or control-is not
covered by the natural resource damage provisions of the statute."'20'
From a semantic point of view the text in s. 9601 (16) seems to require a "nexus"
between the natural resource and governmental control. 20 2 However, views have also
been expressed-and with good arguments-that no special "nexus" should be
required. 20 3
CERCLA also expanded the class of plaintiffs that can bring actions (cf. FWPCA,
supra, which only allows the federal government and authorized representatives of states
201 880 F 2d 432 p. 460.
202 See also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F Supp 609 (1986) and E. W. Warren & J. A. Zackrison,
Natural Resources Damages Provisions of CERCLA. Natural Resources & Environment, Fall 1985 p. 20.
203 See Note, Harvard Law Review. Vol. 99, 1986 p. 1566: "Other provisions of CERCLA appear to give
broad reach to the cause of action for natural resource damage. Section 11 1(b), for example, permits the
United States to assert claims 'as trustee' of any natural resources over which it has 'sovereign rights,'
that is, the power to regulate. Section 107(f) establishes liability for damage to any natural resources
'within the State or belonging to. managed by, controlled by. or appertaining to such State.' This
provision uses the disjunctive 'or.' implying that the nexus termns expand upon mere sovereignty. the
language in these sections indicates that Congress intended that CERCLA be construed broadly to reach
all resources within the government's jurisdiction; a narrower reading of 'natural resources' would
require contorted readings of these sections. Furthermore, distinguishing between privately and publicly
owned natural resources conflicts with CERCLA's goal of forcing defendants to internalize the social
costs of natural resource damage, because all natural resources may provide services to, and be valued
by, the public." See also the discussion in F. B. Cross, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1989 p.
274 n. 14.
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to serve as trustees to recover natural resource damages). In addition to federal and state
governments and Indian tribes (s. 9607 (f)) case law has also given local municipalities
the right to sue for natural resource damages. 204 However, "double recovery" for natural
resource damages, including the costs of damage assessment or restoration, rehabilitation,
or acquisition for the same release and natural resource, is not possible.2
As was mentioned supra, CERCLA provides little guidance on the measurement of
damages. Congress conferred on the President-who in turn delegated to the Department
of the Interior-responsibility for promulgating regulations governing the assessment of
damages for natural resource injuries resulting from releases of hazardous substances, for
the purposes of both CERCLA and the FW\PCA.206 According to s. 9651 (c) these
regulations were originally required to be in place by December 1982.
204 See City ofNew York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F Supp 609 (1986). 31amor ofBoonton v. Drew Chem. Corp.,
621 F Supp 663 (1985). But cf. Tow ofBedford v. Raytheon Co.. 755 F Supp 469 (1991). See also
comment by A. J. Simons & J. M. Wicks. St. John's Law Review. Vol. 63. 1989 p. 806 ff. It is
interesting to note that the pennrmissible plaintiffs (federal. state and local governments) have been
estimated at roughly 68.500 (1987). Adding Indian tribes as authorized trustees brings some 500 more
potential plaintiffs. See B. Breen. Wake Forest Law Review. Vol. 24. 1989 p. 861, 863. But the natural
resource damage suits brought have been few. and to encourage more damage claims to be filed
Congress, when amending CERCLA with the SARA of 1986. added mandatory provisions designed to
force the federal government to notify natural resource trustees of potential damage to seek to involve
them in planning cleanup and to participate in settlement discussions with defendants. lbld. p. 862. The
amendments also obliged the Governor of each State to designate State officials who may act on behalf
of the public as trustees for natural resources under CERCLA (s. 9607 (f)(2)(B)). Among reasons for the
few natural resource damage claims till now have been mentioned the confusing and complicated
assessment regulations, the inadequate understanding of the trustees' responsibilities under CERCLA,
lack of assessment money, a political reluctance to bring lawsuits and bureaucratic comfort. See E. D.
Olson, Natural Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and Colorado Decisions: Where Do We Go
From Here? Environmental Law Reporter. 12-89, ELR 10552 and B. Breen. Wake Forest Law Review,
Vol. 24, 1989 p. 868 f. Finally, it may be mentioned that D. Woodard & M. R. Hope, Natural Resource
Damage Litigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation, and Liability Act,
Harvard Environmental Law Review. Vol. 14, 1990 p. 212 ff.. have recommended that citizens' groups
be allowed to sue on behalf of the public for natural resource damages when federal or state trustees fail
to act. They state: "We believe that such a provision would increase the number of recoveries on behalf
of the public at no cost to the taxpayers and without the need for creating a new right of action for
recovery of damages by private parties" (p. 215).
20o S. 9607 (f)(1).
206 State of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. ofInterior. 880 F 2d 432 (1989) p. 439.
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CERCLA s. 9651 (c)(2) requires two types of procedures for conducting natural
resources damages assessments. Rules under subparagraph (A)-the "Type A" rules-
were to specify "standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal field
observation." Type A regulations were intended to govern "most minor" spills and
releases. 207 Rules under subparagraph (B)-the "Type B" rules-were to specify
"alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to determine the
type and extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss." The intention of
Congress was that the Type B regulations "would be employed in large or unusually
damaging spills and releases." 20 8
Under CERCLA, a trustee seeking damages is not required to resort to Type A or
Type B procedures. However, CERCLA provides that "Any determination or assessment
of damages to natural resources.made by a Federal or State trustee in accordance with the
regulations promulgated under section 9651 of this title shall have the force and effect of
a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee in any administrative or judicial
20' E. D. Olson, Environmental Law Reporter. 12-89. 19 ELR p. 10553. According to Note, Harvard Law
Review. Vol. 99, 1986, p. 1568 n. 20: "Type A assessments based on amount of discharge or units of
affected area are inaccurate methods for estimating actual damage. These formulas unrealistically
assume a 'linear damage function'-that is. they assume the hann is proportional to the quantity of
discharge or the area affected.... Perhaps for this reason. CERCLA's legislative history indicates that
Type A methods should only be used for 'minor' releases." It may also be mentioned that the simplified
Type A damage measurement is accomplished through a computer model (the Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME)). This model estimates injury
based upon user input on certain parameter of the spill and bases damages upon average use values. The
model takes no account of existence or intrinsic values of natural resources nor assigns value to unused
resources. See F. B. Cross, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 42. No. 2. 1989 p. 323 f. The current model is
being revised to comply with the Ohio and Colorado decisions (see infra) to incorporate restoration costs
and nonuse values. as well as to update use values. Further. it is expected that the Department of the
Interior will propose a model for the Great Lakes in the near future. This model will estimate damages
based upon restoration costs and average use and nonuse values. It is anticipated that the models
mentioned here will be adopted for certain spills under OPA. See Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 50,
Friday, March 13, 1992. Proposed Rules p. 8977 f.
208 E. D. Olson, Environmental Law Reporter, 12-89, 19 ELR, p. 10533. Both the Type A and the Type B
regulations must be reviewed and revised as appropriate every two years (s. 9651 (c)(3)).
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proceeding."2 ' 9
The Department of the Interior (DOI) published in August 1986 a final rule
containing the Type B regulations for natural resource damage assessments.10 However,
as a consequence of the SARA amendments DOI issued revised rules in February
1988.211 These regulations were formulated through an extensive rulemaking procedure
and they establish an administrative process as well as procedures for the assessment of
natural resource damage caused by a release of a hazardous substance or a discharge of
oil. The purpose of the DOI regulations is "to provide standardized and cost-effective
procedures for assessing natural resource damages. " ' -
These regulations2 13 have been challenged by a state government, environmental
groups, etc. in Stale of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. ofthe Interior, 880 F 2d 432 (1989). DOI's
209 S. 9607 (f)(2)(C). Congress provided this presumption to make it easier for public trustees to recover
damages. D. Woodard & M. R. Hope, Harvard Environmental Law Review. Vol. 14, 1990 p. 190. This
"rebuttable presumption" works to remove from the judiciary the function of determining or assessing a
damage award. See more on this A. J. Simons & J. M. Wicks. St. John's Law Review. Vol. 63, 1989 p.
813.
20o 51 FR 27725. Aug. 1. 1986.
." 53 FR 5171, Feb. 22. 1988.
21 43 CFR subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 11.11.
213 The process for implementing Type B assessments has been divided into three phases: 1) Injury
Determination phase. The purpose of this phase is to establish that one or more natural resources have
been injured as a result of the discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance; 2) Quantification
phase. The purpose of this phase is to establish the extent of the injury to the resource in terms of the
loss of services that the injured resource would have provided had the discharge or release not occurred.
These services include, inter alia. flood and erosion control, habitat and food chains, as well as such
human uses as recreation. The methodology to be used in the Damage Determination phase is essential
in detennining which services to measure in the Quantification phase. (See Federal Register, Vol. 57,
No. 50, Friday. March 13. 1992. Proposed Rules p. 8975); 3) Damage Determination phase. The
purpose of this phase is to establish the appropriate compensation expressed as a dollar amount for the
injuries established in the Injury Detennination phase and measured in the Quantification phase. (See
43 CFR subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 11.13. It may be mentioned that. although not specifically
mentioned in the regulations. economists are intended to play an essential role in translating injuries to
natural resources into a dollar amount (damages). Because economists integrate the other components
of the damage assessment, close consultation between resource specialists and economists facilitates
accurate damage determination. (See Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 50. Friday March 13, 1992,
Proposed Rules p. 8975.)
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formulation of the Type A regulations was handled in a separate rulemaking proceeding
resulting in a set of rules in March 1987.214 The Type A regulations were the subject of a
separate petition for review in Slate of Colorado v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 880 F 2d
481 (1989).
The Type B regulations provided as a measure of recovery the lesser of either
restoration or replacement costs or the diminution of use values.2  Restoration or
replacement damages are defined as the costs necessary to return the resource services to
the baseline level provided in the absence of damage." 16 The calculation is based upon
the most cost-effective alternative for reaching this objective, and the alternatives
considered must include a "no action" option that relies upon natural recovery alone. 217
Diminution of use values is based upon the reduction in the level of services the injured
214 880 F 2d 432 (1989) p. 440.
21s See 43 CFR Subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) §§ 11.35 and 11.80. When restoration or replacement of the
injured resource is not technically feasible. the diminution in use values. as determined by using the
methodologies listed in § 11.83. or other methodologies that meet the acceptance criterion in § 11.83 of
43 CFR Subtitle A. shall constitute the measure of damages (§ 11.35 (b)(3)). According to § 11.83 (b)
"use values" are '*the value to the public of recreational or other public uses of the resource. as measured
by changes in consumer surplus. any fees or other payments collectable by the government or Indian
tribe for a private part's use of the natural resource, and any economic rent accruing to a private party
because the government or Indian tribe does not charge a fee or price for the use of the resource." It
may be mentioned that focusing on the use value of natural resources is consistent with a long tradition
in U.S. law. Use value has some advantages in comparison with other types of resource value. As F. B.
Cross, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 42. No. 2, 1989 p. 282 f. notes: "Use value is more precise and
less speculative than other types of resource value because it isolates the extent to which people 'put
their money w'here their mouth is'. Use value measures actual behavior. rather than attitudes, and
therefore is a more certain means of ascertaining damages.... Economics largely relies on behavioral
evidence and rejects the relative untrustworthiness of purely hypothetical opinions." However, I think it
is important to remember that reliance on use value has some shortcomings: for example, use value does
not observe that natural resources may have worth beyond their use by hunans. Cf. the option and
existence values mentioned infra.
216 See 43 CFR Subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 11.14.
217 Note, Harvard La-w Review, Vol. 99, 1986 p. 1570 f. Damages also include the diminution in use value
suffered before the resource is restored or replaced (or the trustee determines that the resources should
be allowed to recover naturally), and these social costs are included in the determination of the most
cost-effective route to restoration. IbId. p. 1571. On the traditional definitions of natural resource
damages see also D. Woodard & M. R. Hope. Harvard Environmental Law' Review, Vol. 14, 1990 p.
196 ff.
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resources provided to another resource or to humans (e.g. fishing as a result of the
discharge or release.2 1') The damages that can be recovered are, inter alia, losses in
recreation and other public uses, reduced fees and other payments made to state agencies
for private use of the public resources, and reductions in economic rents.219
The diminution in value approach is dependent on whether the resource is traded in a
market. If there is a reasonably competitive market for the resource, the diminution in
the market price is the measure of lost value.220 In the absence of a market price, the DOI
regulations contain economic techniques for measuring the willingness of individuals to
pay for the lost service or to accept compensation for that loss (see also the text infra). 22 1
Since the diminution in value approach is based upon market values, it probably
undervalues a resource with unique characteristics-like the Prince William Sound after
the Exxon Valdez accident. Further, for most practical purposes the diminution of use
value seems to be much less than the cost of restoration. Although the "lesser of'
218 See also Federal Resister. Vol. 57. No. 50, Friday. March 13. 1992. Proposed Rules p. 8975.
219 See also n. 106 supra. The public trustee cannot collect taxes. income lost by private individuals or
speculative losses. C. J. Cicchetti & N. Peck. Assessing Natural Resource Damages: The Case Against
Contingent Value Survey. Natural Resources & Environment. Vol. 4. No. 1. Spring 1989 p. 6.
220 See D. Woodard & M. R Hope. Harvard Environmental Law Review. Vol. 14. 1990 p. 197 and Note.
Harvard Law Review. Vol. 99. 1986 p. 1571. The Note also points out that "Courts should take care to
distinguish between the market value of resources in the wild and the market value of the 'harvested'
good. The latter price includes the value added by the process of harvest." See more Ibld. p. 1571 f.
More generally one can say about market valuation that it is easy to measure and promotes economic
efficiency. It also carries special indicia of reliability: the method is not based on individuals'
hypothetical valuation of natural resources, but on market considerations. the market measures changes
in the availability of natural resources and the corresponding changes in the actions of individuals. The
resulting economic effects are directly observable and measurable. See F. B. Cross, Vanderbilt Law
Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1989 p. 303. However, as a method for measuring natural resource damages I
think market valuation also has some serious shortcomings: often market valuation will understate the
true societal loss from damage to natural resources, market value may not be an adequate basis for
compensation when property is unique or seldom traded, the lack of a functioning market in publicly
held natural resources is a major impediment to reliance on market valuation, although market valuation
may approximate use value rather well, it fails almost completely to capture the existence and intrinsic
values of damaged natural resources, etc.
221 Note, Harvard Law Review. Vol. 99. 1986 p. 1572.
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approach has been used by courts,222 the application has not been uniform. 223
The "lesser of' rule was the most significant issue in the case Slate of Ohio v. U. S.
Dept. of the Interior. The Court of Appeals struck down the DOI's "lesser of' rule as
being "directly contrary to the clearly expressed intent of Congress." The Court noted:
"'Although our resolution of the dispute submerges us in the minutiae of CERCLA text
and legislative materials. we initially stress the enonnous practical significance of the
'lesser of rule. A hypothetical example will illustrate the point: imagine a hazardous
substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and destroys a habitat for seabirds at a
sealife reserve. The lost use value of the seals and seabird habitat would be measured by
the market value of the fur seals' pelts (which would be approximately S15 each) plus the
selling price per acre of land comparable in value to that on which the spoiled bird habitat
was located. Even if. as likely, that use value turns out to be far less than the cost of
restoring the rookery and seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of
damages eligible for the presumption of recoverability under the Interior rule."
After examining the language and purpose of CERCLA. as well as its legislative history,
we conclude that Interior's 'lesser of rule is directly contrary to the expressed intent of
Congress."'
These argument of the Court of Appeals seem very acceptable. Another view would
have jettisoned restoration as a standard measure of damages in most cases, i.e., the cost
of restoring, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the injured natural resources would
not have been recovered. 225 However, commentators have also expressed some support
See e.g.. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.. 635 F Supp 665 (1986).
3 See D. Woodard & M. R. Hope. Harvard Environmental Law Review. Vol 14. 1990 p. 198 f.
24 880 F 2d p. 442. The legislative history behind both the original CERCLA law and the 1986 SARA
amendments supports granting restoration cost damages. See F. B. Cross, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol.
42, No. 2, 1989. p. 327 ff.
225 I think it is interesting to note that Congress when amending the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) in 1988 explicitly provided that the damages are to be measured as
restoration cost, and only if restoration is not possible is use-value to be resorted to as a second-best
measure.
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for the "lesser of' rule. 226
The DOI regulations also established a hierarchy of assessment methods for
determining "use value," limiting recovery to the price commanded by the resource on
the open market,2 7 unless the trustee finds that "the market for the resource is not
reasonably competitive." If the market is not competitive, an appraisal of the market
value in accordance with the relevant sections of the "Uniform Appraisal Standards for
Federal Land Acquisition" could be used. 28 Only when neither the market nor the
appraisal method were "appropriate" could other techniques of determining use value be
used.2"
:6 Note, Harvard Law Review. Vol. 99, 1986 p. 1569 states: "The objective of the damage awards should
be to force private parties to internalize the social costs imposed by their hazardous waste release so that
these parties will invest optimally in safety precautions. The proper measure of this damage is the
actual loss suffered once society has efficiently mitigated the damage. If the lost resource can be
restored at a cost less than its value. then the cost of restoration is the social loss. If the resource cannot
be restored economically. then the use value foregone is the social loss." The Note further
recommends: "A still better policy would not limit the alternatives to fill restoration cost or use value.
The optimal policy would also consider partial restoration and would require the government to restore
the resource only up to the point at which the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. The defendant
would pay the costs of partial restoration plus compensation for any residual loss in use value. For any
case in which some restoration is optimal. this sum will be less than the total loss in use value when
zero restoration is assumed."
227 It may be mentioned that the court in Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transport Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1869, involving damage claims for steelhead lost in Little Salmon River, approved of, inter alia,
the market value approach: "The commercial value of natural resources is the market price or exchange
value of the resource. This value is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves.
this intersection establishes a market place or exchange value" (p. 23 f.). The court concluded that
there was no directly applicable market price for the fish lost by Idaho. But the court found that the
values used in American Fishery Society's (AFS) publication. Monetary Values of Freshwater Fish and
Fish-Kill Counting Teclmique Guidelines. were the appropriate values in detennining Idaho's losses,
both for wild/natural steelhead and hatchery steelhead. The publication assigns a monetary value to fish
by inch class and species. The AFS values are based, in large part on the average prices set by
commercial fish hatcheries around the U. S., which include the fixed hatchery construction costs of
commercial fish hatcheries.
8 See 43 CFR Subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 11.83 (c)(2). The measure of damages under the appraisal
methodology shall be the difference between the with and without injury appraisal value determined by
the comparable sales approach as described in the Uniform Appraisal Standards.
229 These nonmarketed natural resource methodologies include, inter alia. factor income methodology,
travel cost methodology,. hedonic pricing methodologies and contingent valuation methodology. See
further 43 CFR Subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 11.83. Travel cost studies and hedonic valuation
(methods for behavioral use valuation) were developed by economists seeking to overcome the
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The Court of Appeals held that the hierarchy of use values was not a reasonable
interpretation of the relevant CERCLA statutes. The Court stated:
"While it is not irrational to look to market price as one factor in dctcrmining the use
value of a resource. it is unreasonable to view market price as the exclusive factor, or
even the predominant one. From the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural
resources have values that are not fully captured by the market systemrn.... As we have
previously noted in the context of the 'lesser of rule...market prices are not acceptable as
primary measures of the use values of natural resources....We find that DOI erred by
establishing "a strong presumption in favor of market price and appraisal
methodologies ....Neither the statute not its legislative history evinces any congressional
intent to limit use values to market prices. On the contrar\. Congress intended the
damage assessment regulations to capture fully all aspects of loss....The current rules
defeat this intent by arbitrary li iiting use values to market prices.
On remand. DOI should consider a rule that would permit trustees to derive use values
for natural resources by summing up all reliably calculated use values, however
measured. so long as the tnrustee does not double count.-3)
In addition to rejecting the DOI's hierarchy of assessment methods, the Court of
Appeals also held that option and existence values "may represent 'passive' use, but they
shortcoming of market valuation of public goods. Basically such methods aim to measure the use value
of natural resources by seeking market surrogates for unpriced natural resources. Because the
procedures are based largely on verifiable human behavior they carry special indicia of reliability. The
DOI regulations describe the travel cost methodology as follows: "An individual's incremental travel
costs to an area are used as a proxy for the price of the senices of that area. Damages to the area are the
difference between the value of the area with- and without-a-discharge-or-release. When regional travel
cost models exist. they should be used if appropriate" (§ 11.83 (d)(3)). The travel cost method was used
in Idaho iv Southern Refrigerated Transport Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1869. to determine the value
of a recreational fishing trip and the value per fish caught on such a fishing trip by studying people's
actual expenditure in traveling to various sites in Idaho to fish for steelhead. The court found that the
values for steelhead determined using the USFS study (this study was performed by the United States
Forest Service, the University of Idaho, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers, the Bureau of Land Management,. and F&G for purposes of forest planning. land
management planning, and water resource management) were appropriate values to establish
recreational values for the non-returning adult steelhead to Idaho. According to § 11.83 (d)(4) hedonic
pricing methodologies "can be used to determine the value of nomnarketed resources by an analysis of
private market choices. The demand for nonmarketed natural resources is thereby estimated indirectly
by an analysis of commodities that are traded in a market." On the advantages/shortcomings of these
methods see e.g.. F. B. Cross, Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 42, No. 2. 1989 p. 309 ff. and comments in
Federal Register, Vol. 57. No. 50. Friday, March 13, 1992, Proposed Rules p. 8976.
230 880 F 2d p. 462 ff.
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nonetheless reflect utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus, primafacie,
ought to be included in a damage assessment." '-3 This brings me to the third interesting
valuation question the Court of Appeals dealt with; viz., the contingent valuation method
challenged by petitioners in Slate of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior.
The DOI regulations also sanctioned resort to contingent valuation methodology in
determining option232 and existence 233 values. Contingent valuation is a convenient,
direct measure for assessing natural resource damages. Among economic valuation
methods, only contingent valuation measures the option and existence values of natural
resources. Because researchers now have considerable experience of using contingent
valuation, it is achieving credibility. However, because contingent valuation is entirely
hypothetical (measures people's attitudes, not their actual behavior), it has its
weaknesses.234 To describe this methodology I quote the Court of Appeals:
a3 880 F 2d p. 464. It is also to be observed that the CERCLA regulations respecting assessment of
damage to natural resources (42 USC s. 9651 (c)(2)) "shall identify the best available procedures to
determine such damages. including both direct and indirect injury., destruction, or loss and shall take
into consideration factors including, but not limited to (my undln). replacement value, use value and
ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover."
23 Option value is derived from individuals' desire to preserve the option to use a natural resource, even if
they are not currently using it. A. J. Simons & J. M. Wicks. St. John's Law Review. Vol. 63. 1989 p.
811 n. 50. See also the following n.
33 Existence value is derived from the satisfaction of simply knowing that a resource exists, even if no use
occurs. See also Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transport inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1896, in which
the court recognized that the existence value does exist and would be an appropriate item of damage if
proved at trial (the case involved damage claims for lost fish). To my mind. nonuse existence value has
three distinct subparts. Option value represents the willingness of people to pay something to preserve
their ability to use a natural resource, e.g., see the Grand Canyon. Vicarious value derives from the
willingness of people to pay for the preservation of a natural resource. e.g.. wildlife, even though they
will never use (or see) the resource. Finally, intertemporal value represents the monetary value of the
ability to bequeath natural resources to future generations. Although existence value may play a
significant role in assessing the importance of natural resources, this value has its shortcomings too.
Because existence value is demonstrated attitudinally, and not behaviorally, one may question how
strongly the value is truly held. Does it make possible accurate measurement? Further, as is the case
with use value, existence value seems to ignore the widespread (but not undisputed) belief that natural
things have some value of their own-not just a value to human beings. However, this intrinsic value is
very difficult to measure.
24 It may be mentioned that many commentators in Federal Register. Vol 57, No. 50, Friday, March 13,
"The CV [contingent valuation] process 'includes all techniques that set up hypothetical
markets to elicit an individual's economic valuation of a natural resource.' CV involves
a series of interviews with individuals for the purpose of ascertaining the values they
respectively attach to particular changes in particular resources. Among the several
formats available to an intcrviewcr in developing the hypothetical scenario embodied in a
CV survey are direct questioning. by which the interviewer learns how much the
interviewec is willing to pay for the resource: bidding formats. for example. the
interviewec is asked whether he or she would pay a given amount for a resource and.
depending upon the response, the bid is set higher or lower until a final price is derived:
and a 'take or leave it' format. in which the interviewee decides whether or not he or she
is willing to pay a designated amount of money for the resource. CV methodology thus
enables ascertainment of individually-expressed values for different levels of quality or
resources. and dollar values of individuals' changes in well-being.. - -
The Court upheld contingent valuation as consistent with due process and
CERCLA.23 6 As this valuation method identifies non-use values separate from use
values, it may be valuable from the perspective of public trustees. Non-use damage
assessments could result in extensive amounts of natural resource damages. 237
1992, Proposed Rules p. 8976 expressed reluctance in allowing the use of CV to measure nonuse values
because of its uncertainty. More study is needed on the use of CV to measure nonuse values. Other
commentators proposed that limitations on the use of CV should be imposed. They suggested that CV,
for example, should be used only when irreversible injury or unique resources are involved.
23' 880 f 2d p. 475. 43 CFR Subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 121.83 (d)(5) reads: "(i) the contingent
valuation methodology includes all techniques that set up hypothetical markets to elicit an individual's
economic valuation of a natural resource. This methodology can determine use values and explicitly
detennine option and existence values. (ii) The use of the contingent valuation methodology to
explicitly estimate option and existence values should be used only if the authorized official determines
that no use values can be determined." On contingent valuation see also E. D. Olson, Environmental
Law Reporter, 12-89, 19 ELR p. 10555 and D. Woodard & M. R. Hope. Harvard Environmental Law
Review, Vol 14, 1990 p. 201 with references. D. Woodard & M. R. Hope also recommend that
CERCLA be amended to include a definition which explicitly states that natural resource damages
include both use values and nonuse values, Ibld p. 207.
236 880 F 2d p. 476 ff. Although the quotation supra deals with contingent valuation measures of
willingness to pay, there are also good arguments for using willingness to sell to provide the measure of
natural resource value: willingness to sell measures may better represent the true value that people
place on natural resources (while willingness to pay measures may underestimate the true damage to
natural resources), the "income effect" (the effect of the interviewee's income level) seems to have less
impact on willingness to sell measures than on pay measures. uncertainty about nature and its
homeostasis seems to me to provide a reason for preferring willingness to sell. etc.
" See D. Woodard & M. R. Hope, Harvard Environmental Law Review. Vol 14. 1990 p. 201 f. Studies
suggest that option and existence values may be several times greater than use values. See F. B. Cross,
The DOI's Type B Natural Resource Damage Assessment Regulations were also
challenged on several other grounds. But the Court of Appeals upheld the regulations;
among them the "committed use" requirement,23 8 the adoption of a ten percent discount
rate to calculate the present value of an expected future injury, 39 the "responsible party
participation" 240 and the limitation on recovery of assessment costs.241
In the light of the State of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. of the htierior decision striking down
the Type B rules, which were the basis for the Type A rules, and especially the
determination that restoration costs are a basic measure of damages under CERCLA (and
the FWPCA), and that the market value-based hierarchy is non-consistent with the Act,
the Court of Appeals remanded the Type A regulations so that they too would be made
consistent with CERCLA (and the FWPCA). 24 2 Thus both the Type A and the Type B
regulations were remanded and, which is important, the Department of the Interior
Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 42. No. 2, 1989 p. 288 f.
38 The DOI's rules require that in order for a trustee to recover for damage to natural resources. those
resources must have had a "committed use." See 43 CFR Subtitle A (10-1-91 Edition) § 11.84 (b). A
"committed use" is defined in the rules as "either: a current public use: or a planned public use of a
natural resource for -which there is a documented legal, administrative. budgetary. or financial
commitment established before the discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance is detected" (§
11.14 (h)). See the Court's discussion 880 F 2d p. 461 f.
239 See 880 F 2d p. 464 f. It may be mentioned that this rule was criticized by quite a few commentators in
Federal Register. Vol. 57. No. 50. Friday,. March 13, 1992, Proposed rules p. 8975.
240 The DOI's regulations allow potentially responsible parties to participate in the damage assessment
process. See 880 F 2d p. 465 ff. and Federal Register, Vol 57. No. 50. Friday, March 13, 1992,
Proposed Rules p. 8969.
2' As was mentioned earlier CERCLA imposes liability on responsible parties for also the "reasonable
costs of assessing" natural resource damage. State and environmental groups challenged a provision in
the DOI regulations limiting the definition of"reasonable costs" to situations where "the anticipated
cost of the assessment is expected to be less than the anticipated damage amount" (§ 11.14 (ee)). The
Court of Appeals upheld the rule as "a rational one" and "consonant with the statutory purpose." See
880 F 2d p. 468. However, commentators in Federal Register. Vol 57. No. 50, Friday, March 13, 1992,
Proposed Rules p. 8975 have criticized the definition claiming that "the rule should not try to define the
term since the determination of 'reasonable' must be made on a case-by-case basis and would vary, for
example, depending upon the type of habitat affected."
242 See E. D. Olson, Environmnental Law Reporter, 12-89, 19 ELR p. 10555 f. and State of Colorado v. U.S.
Dept. of the Interior, 880 F 2d 481 (1989).
announced that it will not appeal the Court's decisions. " Instead, the DOI regulations
are being revised in accordance with the Ohio and Colorado decisions. 44
Although claims for natural resource damages have been relatively few up to now,24 5
it is to be expected that the trustees will be more active in this field in the future.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the courts' broad interpretation of "natural
resource damages" under CERCLA-including both use and non-use values-which
DOI seems to have adopted, the liability for responsible parties, including
shipowner/operators, may be very extensive. But again, the CERCLA provisions on
limiting liability (see Part III. 1.2.2. supra) may lighten the liability exposure for the
shipping industry.
Finally, it may be mentioned, by way of comparison, that both the Convention on
Civil Liability for Damage Caused During the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road,
Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels, 1989 and the Draft International Convention on
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous
and Noxious Substances by Sea have adopted the definition of compensable damage used
in the 1984 Protocol to the 1969 CLC.246 As was mentioned before (see Part IV. 1.1.1.
supra) this definition covers reinstatement costs-both actually undertaken and future-
but not claims for damage to the marine environment as such. Thus the coverage of
243 See E. D. Olson. Environmental Law Reporter, 12-89. 19 ELR p. 10556. It is interesting to note that D.
Woodard & M. R. Hope, Harvard Environmental Law Review. Vol 14. 1990. p. 190 ff. argue that
Congress should abolish the DOI damage assessment regulations which according to them "contain
serious flaws."
244 Federal Register, Vol 57. No. 50. Friday, March 13, 1992, Proposed Rules p. 8977.
245 On the number of presented claims see e.g., B. Breen, Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 24, 1989 p. 867
ff. and D. Woodard & M. R. Hope. Harvard Emnironmental Law Review. Vol. 14. 1990 p. 191 ff.
246 See the CRTD Convention art. 1.10. and the Draft HNS Convention art 1.6.
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natural resource damaiges are broader under CERCLA.
IV.2. Non-statutory maritime law
State and federal government officials have been authorized to recover from polluters
natural resource damages under either, or both, public trust doctrine and the doctrine of
parenspatriae-although the theories have been infrequently used." In Matter of
Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F Supp 38 (1980) the District Court (E. D. Virginia) described
the doctrines as follows:
"'Under public trust doctrine, federal government and states have right and duty to protect
and preserve public's interest in natural wildlife resources. and such right does not derive
from ownership of resources but from duty owning to people.... Under doctrine of parens
patriae, state acts to protect a quasi-sovereign interest where no individual cause of action
would lie." 4
In this case the Court held that although neither federal government nor Virginia
owned migratory waterfowl which were killed as result of an oil spill in Chesapeake Bay,
they could recover from the vessel owner under either, or both, theories. In State of
Maine v. M/V Tamano. 357 F Supp 1097 (1973) the State of Maine brought suit against,
inter alia, vessel owners to recover damages incurred as a result of discharge into waters
of Casco Bay of approximately 100,000 gallons of Bunker C oil from a tanker which
struck an outcropping on a ledge while passing through Hussey Sound. The District
Court (D. Maine, S.D.) held that the State had sufficient independent interest in its coastal
247 See T. J. Schoenbaum. The Forum, Vol. 20. 1984 p. 158. An explanation why litigants rarely invoke the
parenspatriae doctrine for recovering damages for harm done to natural resources might be some
limitations on parenspatriae precedents. See F. B. Cross. Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 42. No. 2,
1989 p. 278.
24s 495 F Supp p. 39 f. The concept ofparenspatriae was derived from the English constitutional system.
But the nature of the parens patriae suit has been greatly expanded in the United States beyond that
which existed in England. For a historical survey of the parens patriae suit see Hawaii v. Standard Oil
waters and their marine life to permit it to seek damages in its parens patriae capacity.249
Furthermore, the Court held that assertions that any injury to the State's interests was too
speculative to be reduced to money damages and that there was risk of double damages
were matters of proof to be met at trial and did not mandate dismissal at the pleading
stage.250 Also other courts have permitted a State to bring a damage claim in aparens
patriae capacity for injury to its waters and marine life allegedly resulting from marine
oil spills.251
However, in order to award natural resource damages they have to be measured. We
meet the problems discussed above. Presumably the DOI regulations and the State of
Ohio 1. Dept. of the k nerior case (see Part IV.1.2.2. supra) will have significance also
outside federal statutory law. Of special interest in this respect is further the current
Exxon Valdez litigation. Because of its size and the extent of the damages involved this
litigation has the potential of becoming the leading case also regarding damage
assessment. 2 52
Co.. 405 U. S. 251 (1971) p. 257 ft.
249 The Court stated: "...the right of a State to sue as parens pariae is not limited to suits to protect only its
proprietary interests: a State also may maintain an action parenspatriae on behalf of its citizens to
protect its so-called 'quasi-sovereign' interests....A quasi-sovereign interest must be an interest of the
State 'independent of and behind the titles of its citizens.'...: that is. in order to maintain a parens
patriae suit, the State 'must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the
benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest.'...It is clear that Maine has an independent
interest in the quality and condition of her coastal waters. It has long been established by decisions of
the Supreme Court. and of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. that a State has sovereign interests in
its coastal waters and marine life. as well as in its other natural resources, which interests are separate
and distinct from the interests of its individual citizens:" 357 F Supp p. 1099 f.
so0 375 F Supp p. 1097.
25' See e.g., Maryland Dept. of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F Supp 1060 (1972); State
of Cal., Department ofFish and Game v. S.S. Bournemouth. 307 F Supp 922 (1969); Puerto Rico v.
S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F 2d 652 (1980): Re Oswego Barge Corp.. 439 F Supp 312 and Re Lloyd's
Leasing, Ltd., 697 F Supp 289 (1988).
252 See also S. Keeva, ABA Journal. February 1991 p. 68. In the Exxon Valdez litigation a nunber of
environmental groups have sued for, inter alia, natural resource damages using common law, state law,
and citizens' suit provisions in federal statutes as the legal basis for their actions. Ibld p. 68. Further, it
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A different matter is that the possibility of bringing claims for natural resource
damages under non-statutory maritime law does not seem to be very significant today.
this is because of the broad coverage of natural resource damages under the FWPCA,253
CERCLA and the OPA-regarding both the notion of compensable damage and the right
to claim. Furthermore, the earlier mentioned Limitation of Liability Act, 1851 (see Part
111.2. supra) has to be noted; it may considerably limit a claim for natural resource
damages.
IV.3. Summary
The study has shown that damage to natural resources is well covered under U.S.
compensation law. The OPA covers restoration and replacement costs, diminution in
value of natural resources pending restoration and reasonable costs of assessing damage.
Under CERCLA damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including reasonable costs of damage assessment, are recoverable. In addition, natural
resource damages are covered under the FWPCA (restoration or replacement costs), the
TAPAA (the extent and types of damages recoverable seem to be unclear, however) and
non-statutory maritime law (the doctrines of public trust and parenspatriae).
However, the question of measurement of damage seems to be unsettled and largely
is interesting to note that Judge Shortell 9Alaska Superior Curt) has certified five classes of plaintiffs:
1) seafood and cannery workers (December 14, 1990); 2) Alaska natives; 3) area businesses; 4)
commercial fishermen: and 5) property owners (classes 2-5 on February 14, 1991). However, Judge
Holland (U.S. District Court) refused to certify any plaintiff classes ('Numerous classes would
assuredly generate confilsion in what is already complicated litigation. -with no countervailing
benefits"). See Lloyd's Environmental Law International. Vol. 1. No. 3, March 1991 p. 5 f. On the
question of class action see also J. F. Ghent, Annotation, Propriety. Under Rules 23 (a) and 23 (b) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. as Amended in 1966, of Class Action Seeking Relief Against
Pollution of Envirorunent, 7 ALR Fed 907.
253 As already pointed out the FWPCA does not seem to have much practical significance regarding
liability for pollution damage after the enactment of CERCLA and the OPA.
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unspecified in court practice. But the DOI regulations promulgated under CERCLA will
be of importance also outside the scope of CERCLA and the FWPCA (the OPA awaits
regulations for the assessment of natural resource damages). In State of Ohio v. US.
Dept. of the Iterior and State of Colorado v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior the Court of
Appeals considered both the Type A and Type B regulations. The Court struck down the
"lesser of' rule as being contrary to the intent of Congress, did not approve the hierarchy
of assessment methods for determining "use values," but upheld contingent valuation
methodology in determining option and existence values as consistent with due process
and CERCLA. The Department of the Interior was content with the decisions and is
currently revising the regulations (in close cooperation with the work on producing OPA
regulations performed by the NOAA). Consequently, a valuation of natural resource
damage approving restoration costs as a basic measure for damages and identifying both
use and non-use values may result in extensive amounts of natural resource damages. As
was pointed out before the ongoing Exxon Valdez litigation is of great interest also in this
respect.
Also, the right to bring claims for natural resource damages has been gradually
extended. From federal and state officials (FWPCA and non-statutory maritime law) the
class of plaintiffs that can bring actions has been expanded to Indian tribes and, in some
cases, to local municipalities (CERCLA). The OPA gives the right to sue to the U.S.
Government, a State, an Indian tribe and to a foreign government. It will be interesting to
see if further court practice extends this right also to local municipalities.
On the whole one can say that shipowners/operators are exposed to the risk of severe
liability for damage to natural resources caused by discharges of oil or other hazardous
-- --
substances. It is a liability that, however, might be limited in accordance with the
different rules on limiting liability under U.S. law. But it is to be noted that liability
under the OPA is largely unlimited and that U.S. court practice has shown that statutory
liability limits are far from "unbreakable."
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
V.1. Oil pollution
The USA has neither ratified the 1969 CLC and the 1971 FC nor acceded to the
amending Protocols of 1984-although we applied considerable public and private
pressure to shape the international instruments according to U.S. wishes (e.g., raising the
monetary limits and amounts in the conventions). 254 These instruments provide a
consistent and proficient regime for compensating injured parties for oil pollution
damages, and it is to be noted that the CLC/FC system has functioned rather well.
Compensation has been paid relatively quickly-bearing in mind the frequently complex
issues involved-and the claimants have in most cases received adequate compensation.
IOPC Fund has also developed parameters for compensating property damage and
economic losses and has established guidelines for restoration of natural resources.2 55
Further, the new definitions adopted (e.g., of"pollution damage") and the clarifications
made in the 1984 Protocols will contribute to the harmonization of law in Contracting
States.2:
The U.S. Congress adopted its own oil pollution legislation (OPA) which essentially
:54 See also G. W. Paulsen. Why the United States Should Ratify the 1984 Protocols to the International
Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969) and the Establislunent of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971). The Forum. Vol. 20, 1984 p.
164 ff. It is interesting to note that the United States declined to ratify the 1969 CLC and 1971 FC
largely because of dissatisfaction with the liability limits, the difficulty of increasing limits in the future,
and concern for the states' role in pollution protection. However. in spite of the U.S. dissatisfaction
with the international limits, the domestic limits remained roughly equal to the international limits from
1978 to 1990. See T. J. Wagner. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis. Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce. Vol. 21. No. 4, October, 1990 p. 572.
2S5 See also J. Gallagher, New England Law Review, Vol. 25, Winter 1990 p. 615. See further on the Fund
system and the Fund's activities R. H. Ganten, The International System for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damages. An Assessment based on the Experiences of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund. Marlus 62. Oslo 1981.
256 See also M. Jacobsson & N. Trotz. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. Vol. 17, No. 4, October,
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endangered the coming into force of the 1984 Protocols. 257 The decision not to accede to
the 1984 Protocols has been much criticized; e.g., President Bush chastized Congress for
refusing to endorse the international oil spill treaties.'
The state of U.S. oil spill law before the enactment of the OPA was unconscionably
inconsistent and also afflicted with deficiencies-a situation which was intolerable for
the maritime community.2 59 Despite the well intended attempt to combat a new and
growing problem by the enactment of the FWPCA, this legislation soon became
inadequate. Because of its limited liability provisions it ran the risk of substantially
undercompensating those who were injured by an oil spill. For example, the liability
1986 p. 491.
2s7 The required quantity of contributing oil cannot in practice be obtained without U.S. participation. The
U.S. imports over 400 million tons of oil annually. It may be added that an Intersessional Working
Group was set up by the IOPC Fund Assembly at its 13th session iwith the mandate to consider the
future development of the intergovernmental oil pollution liability and compensation system by, inter
alia, considering whether it would be possible to facilitate the entry into force of the content of the 1984
Protocols, possibly by amending their entry into force provisions. See IOPC Fund. Sixth Intersessional
Working Group. FUND/WGR 6/3. 22 January 1991. The Intersessional Working Group held two
meetings and decided to recommend to the Assembly that the entry into force provisions of the 1984
Protocols should be amended. See IOPC Fund, Sixthl Intersessional Working Group, FUND/WGR
6/12. The Assembly decided (14th session) to make a request to the Secretary-General of IMO that an
international conference be convened as soon as possible to consider the proposed amendments. See
IOPC Fund. Assembly. FUND/A 14/WP 3. 11 October 1991. The conference is scheduled for
November 23-27. 1992.
28 Former President Bush stated. inter alia.: "H.R 1465 does not implement the 1984 Protocols to the
1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention. These oil spill treaties. if ratified.
would provide our Nation with swift and assured compensation for foreign tanker oil spills and access
to up to $260 million per spill from an international fund. Our failure to ratify the Protocols may
weaken long-standing U.S. leadership in the development of international maritime
standards....Ultimately. the threat of oil pollution is a global challenge, and the solutions we devise must
be broad enough to address the needs of all nations. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give imnunediate
consideration to the international Protocols and give its advice and consent to ratification of these
treaties." The quotation is from The Scandinavian Shipping Gazette. No. 36. September 7, 1990 p. 7.
See also letter from S. K. Skinner. Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation to G. J. Mitchell: "...If
we do not ratify good international agreements, like the Protocols, we will have no credibility in
negotiating other crucial international environmental measures and we will suffer both economically
and environmentally." Quoted from J. Gallagher. New England Law Review. Vol. 25, winter 1990 p.
616 n. 346. it may be mentioned that Senate Democratic leader George Mitchell led the opposition to
the international protocols. as he feared it would limit the liability of major oil companies in the event of
a spill. Lloyd's List, Monday August 20, 1990.
:59 See also D. A. Bagwell, 4 LMCLO. 1987 P. 522.
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limits under the FWPCA-and also under TAPAA-were quite inadequate for a disaster
of the Exxon Valdez type. Further, there was no statutory language.allowing for recovery
for private claimants. 6
The OPA has largely remedied these deficiencies. The new scheme allows for access
to the courts for private citizens and increases considerably the amount of money
available for compensation. Further, it has made compensation legislation more clear
(although not completely) and comprehensive by, inter alia, amending the TAPAA and
repealing the OCSLA and the DPA.26'
The right to compensation for damage caused by oil pollution (including recovery for
private claimants) has been essentially extended in the OPA. The text of the OPA
provisions covering recovery for pure economic losses seems to be even broader than the
wording of the corresponding provisions in the 1984 Protocols. Future court rulings will
expose possible differences between the OPA and the IOPC Fund practice. Further, the
right to recovery for natural resource damages under OPA deviates from the solutions
adopted in the 1984 Protocols. OPA requires the measure of damages to be the costs of
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement or acquisition of the equivalent resources, plus the
diminution in value of those resources, pending restoration, while the definition of
260 See also J. Gallagher, New Eneland Law Review., Vol. 25. Winter 1990 p. 594 and M. J. Uda, Virginia
Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, 1991 p. 418, 428.
:61 It may also be mentioned that doubts have been expressed whether the OPA actually constitutes a device
to encourage cooperation -with the regulated industry and the executive branch of the government. The
OPA seems to be very command-and-control oriented and might therefore elicit resistance from the
executive branch and the oil industry. Further, the OPA's ability to effectively resolve the confusion
and inefficiency associated with oil spill removal operations has been questioned. E.g., T. J. Wagner,
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 21, No. 4, October, 1990 notes: "Rather than simplify
and streamline the removal process by placing responsibility in a single agency, the Act exacerbates the
already convoluted removal process. The kibitsing and finger-pointing which so drastically impeded
the Alaskan clean-up effort will almost necessarily be compounded under any oil spill removal program
in the future. In this respect. the Act appears to fall dramatically short of furnishing an improved
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"pollution damage" in the 1984 Protocols covers the costs of reasonable measures (also
future) of reinstatement. The latter definition seems to make it clear that claims for
damage to the marine environment as such ("pure environmental damage") are not
admissible. No regulations for the assessment of natural resource damage under OPA
have yet been promulgated, but the NOAA is working on the issue. Meanwhile, the DOI
regulations, as modified by the court decisions of Ohio and Colorado (approving
restoration costs as a basic measure of damages and identifying both use and non-use
values), will have significance for the valuation of natural resource damage also under the
OPA. Thus the OPA constitutes a fairly comprehensive legislation for compensating
damage caused by oil pollution-also in an international comparison.
Another significant difference between the OPA and the international compensation
regimes is the largely unlimited liability under OPA. This is quite a controversial
issue.26 2 My view is, that a broad notion of compensable environmental damage does not
fit very well with the principle of limiting liability. What is the use of comprehensive
liability if it can be considerably limited? Further, a statutory right to limit liability
contrasts with the fundamental principle in tort law that damage caused shall be
compensated in full.
In modern legal discussions insurance considerations have often been cited as the
raison d' etre of limiting liability. Insurance costs constitute part of a shipping
removal process" (p. 585).
262 In the statement mentioned earlier, see n. 149 supra, President Bush also said: "I am concerned about
another consequence of the failure to ratify the Protocols. We must work to ensure that, in response to
the provisions of this Act, a situation is not created in which larger oil shippers seeking to avoid risk are
replaced by smaller companies with limited assets and a reduced ability to pay for the cleanup of oil
spills. We will need to monitor developments in order to protect against such undesirable
consequences."
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company's normal operating costs but the shipowner should be relieved of liability for
disasters, i.e., risks where the damage caused by one and the same incident is
exceptionally large and against which it is impossible to maintain insurance or, where
possible, it can only be done at an unreasonably high cost (the principle of
insurability).263 These arguments are to a large degree based on protectionist and
political considerations.264
However, I find it difficult to accept that the insurance industry's capacity constitutes
an obstacle to unlimited liability; this is because of the minimal overall economic and
practical significance of limited liability rules, the character of maritime liability
insurance and the present-day structure and capacity of the international reinsurance
market.:" Further, the role played by insurance costs in competition seems frequently to
have been exaggerated in international discussion. The introduction of unlimited liability
would mean only a marginal-if even that-increase in operating costs. 266 Of course it is
263 The insurance factor ,was emphasized during the work on drafting the Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims. 1976. Similar argumnents were advanced when the 1969 CLC and the
1971 FC were introduced and in the work of drafting the Convention on Liability and Compensation in
Connection vith the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances bv Sea. The limits of liability
contained in the conventions on nuclear damage (Paris 1960. Brussels 1963, Vienna 1963) are also
justified on the grounds of the high risks involved and of the mutual relations between the questions of
who is liable. limits of liability and the obligation to maintain insurance.
264 The limitation of liability encountered in maritime law has been justified during its historical
development mainly on protectionist and political grounds.
265 It may be noted that maximum market cover for shipowners according to reinsurance system 1992/1993
is $1.05 billion. In the event that claims exceed the market cover, the overspill goes to all P & I Clubs
in the International Group (the Group consists of 14 Clubs representing approximately 90-95% of the
commercial fleet in the world). This system facilitates a large capacity. It is also interesting to note that
shipowners are working towards the establishment of an Excess Insurance Fund (EIF) which aims to
provide cover in excess of existing P & I. This work has been initiated by the risk of unlimited liability
for oil pollution. with only limited insurance cover. Further. it may be added that the market capacity
was estimated at $100 million at the time of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims, 1976. The capacity has thus increased ten-fold and in view of inflation since 1976, there is
consequently an urgent need to raise the 1976 limits.
266 Consequently, I cannot accept insurance costs as a key argument for limitation of maritime liability.
Such arguments are not nonnally acceptable in other fields and, furthermore, there exist other means of
giving favorable treatmcnt to national merchant fleets and improving their international
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important that maritime liability be insured. 267 It is also understandable that insurers and
re-insurers wish to know the total risk to which they are exposed. Risk assessment is
necessary in order to calculate premiums, for example, and to arrange appropriate
reinsurance cover. But this does not mean by any means that liability for damage has to
be limited. ' 8 An insurance obligation can also be limited to a certain amount. 6 9
Limitation of liability means that the industry (here shipping) causing the damage is
in part relieved from the obligation to pay compensation, an obligation which should
form part of the enterprise's normal operating costs (cf the "polluter pays" principle 2 70).
The industry is favored at the expense of the injured party.27' The principle should be
competitiveness. This should not be at the expense of the injured parties.
267 Cf. the obligation to establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility under the OPA and the
1969 CLC.
268 It is interesting to note that. since P & I cover is traditionally unlimited (except for oil pollution and
charterer's liability). the Clubs de facto have covered unlimited liability in some instances, e.g., when
there are no applicable limitation provisions or when the shipowner loses his right to limitation.
269 It is probable that were unlimited liability introduced. insurers would fix a ceiling on their liability: this
would soon adapt to the new situation. The excess. more or less theoretical. liability would then fall
upon the shipping industry. However. this does not mean that the industry would in any way be placed
in a special position. Limitation of liability is not accepted in other fields. For example. in connection
with an accident at sea a shipyard that has carried out repairs or a company that has cargo interests in
the transport of hazardous substances might find themselves faced with extensive and unlimited
liability. Shipping should, in principle, bear the economic consequences of the damage it causes in the
same way as other industries. In the final analysis this liability is transferred to the shipowner's
customers and consequently to the consumers and other users of transported goods. From the
environmental point of view this seems quite acceptable as consumers of pollutants must be prepared to
take greater responsibility for environmental costs. See also E. Gold. Marine Pollution Liability After
"Exxon Valdez": The U.S. "All-Or-Nothing" Lottery. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. Vol.
22, No. 3, July-October. 1991 p. 439.
270 In accordance with this principle it is primarily the polluter who bears the cost of damage since it would
seem reasonable that the person who gains economic advantage from an activity should also bear the
expenses and costs occasioned by the activity. Originally the "polluter pays" principle seems to have
developed within public law-i.e.. as a tool of environmental policy to avoid distortions of competition
in international trade from externalization of pollution prevention costs-and from there it has later
influenced the law of torts to indicate that increasing role of civil liability to compensate pollution
damage from the past and to set responsibilities for the future. See J. Wansink, Environmental Liability
Insurance in Europe and the United States, Environmental Liability Law Quarterly, 3-1989. It may be
mentioned that the "polluter pays" principle is supported by both the OECD and the EC.
271 An example of this is the Star Clipper accident, which happened in Sweden in January 1980. In this
case the ship collided with the bridge connecting the island of Tjom with the mainland. As a
consequence the bridge collapsed and many lorries and cars drove into the sea. The limitation amount
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that the person deriving financial gain from an activity should in the first instance, bear
the costs of damage caused by the activity.
My conclusion is that liability for damage to the environment should be unlimited as
far as possible 272'-therefore the OPA is a step in the right direction. Liability which
exceeds a possible insurance ceiling or financial security maintained should be borne by
the activity causing the damage. This might further the willingness to institute preventive
measures, 273 and when it comes to determining the reasonableness of unlimited liability,
the injured party's justified rights to compensation should not be forgotten. Even if cases
may occur where the claimant does not receive full compensation because the claim
exceeds the insurance amount or security maintained (e.g., in the event of the insolvency
of the responsible party), it is nonetheless correct in principle that liability exists. The
claimant's situation in such cases could be improved by means of various complementary
arrangements (funds, etc.) 274-cf. the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund under OPA. On the
of the Star Clipper was something about SEK 5-6 million but the damage was estimated to be nearly a
hundred times more: a new bridge about SEK 110 million, the lost of profit for industry about SEK 300
million and the rest of the total of nearly SEK 500 million was damage for lost lives, lorries and cars
etc.
' It is interesting to note that the EC Commission does not propose any financial limits in its Proposal for
a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste (COM (89) 282 final-SYN 217.
amended version (COM (91) 219 final-SYN 217)). The Draft Convention on Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment drawn up within the Council of Europe. only refers to
provisions on limited liability in national law (Art. 12). It may be added that there are also countries
with unlimited liability of nuclear operator, e.g., Australia. German.'. Hungary. Japan and Switzerland.
273 It may be mentioned that one consequence of the OPA enactment is that the oil companies have already
tightened up their control of chartered ships. See The Scandinavian Shipping Gazette, No. 46,
November 16, 1990 p. 10. Further. the need for slhipping to upgrade its standards, its manpower
training and operational practices and its ship design and maintenance has been emphasized by the U.S.
legislation. See M. Grey, Aspects of the Oil Pollution Act. BIMCO Bulletin 1/92, January/February p.
7.
274 The complementary funding system could be built with public (e.g.. through taxes and fees) or private
money or by a combination of both. Cf. the U.S. nuclear liability protection system which embodies
political commitment to provide additional funds if claims exceed the $7.4 billion coverage available
from primary ($200 million liability insurance from private insurance pools) and secondary (excess
liability assessed to U.S. utilities based on the number of nuclear plant licenses held by each utility)
layers. See F. F. Heiman.n The U.S. Liability Protection System for Nuclear Power Plants, paper
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other hand, it must be admitted that an effective and functioning complementary
compensation system means that misgivings about limitation of liability at the "primary
level" are reduced, cf. the IOPC Fund. The "assailability" of such a system is in principle
dependent on how well it guarantees compensation for the injured party.
However, the OPA differences mentioned supra, i.e., primarily the broad noting of
compensable damage and the right for the states to introduce unlimited liability, also
cause some unification problems on both the national and international level. It is
important for claimants, responsible parties and their insurers, etc., that OPA liability be
applied uniformly throughout the country. But the Act specifically provides that it does
not preempt the individual states from imposing any additional liability or requirements
with respect to the discharge of oil within a state or any removal activities in connection
with such a discharge. The OPA provides further that it is not meant to affect or modify
existing state law including common law. Therefore the development of a uniform and
comprehensive rule of law in this area seems seriously hampered. 27 5
From an international point of view one can say that the action by Congress not to
accede to the 1984 Protocols has made it difficult to establish a workable world-wide
compensation system for oil spills. The shipping industry, and the tanker segment in
particular, is an international enterprise and, therefore, solutions to its problems are best
solved on the international level.276 Oil pollution from accidental spills usually affects
prepared for delivery at OECD Symposium on Nuclear Accidents-Liabilities and Guarantees,
Helsinki. Finland, September 2. 1992.OECD
75 Also T. J. Wagner, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. Vol. 21. No. 4, October, 1990 is critical:
"In effect, the Act replaces the former patchwork of inconsistent federal programs with a new
hodgepodge-one federal statute overlapping numerous state provisions and general maritime law and
common law remedies" (p. 585).
276 See further testimonies supporting the ratification of the international oil pollution liability scheme
-
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several legal systems. Therefore national legislation and systems of liability should be as
uniform as possible. This works to the advantage of the person suffering damage (in this
way "forum shopping" and other jurisdictional as well as choice of law problems are
reduced), whereas variations in the legislation applied reduce protection. Internationally
uniform liability systems are also an advantage for liability insurers and enhance their
potential for providing better protection.
Thus the decision of the U.S. Congress to remain outside the internationally accepted
oil pollution compensation scheme and enact its own legislation, the OPA, has increased
the unpredictability and uncertainty of the legal framework surrounding international oil
spills. Ratification of the 1984 Protocols would also have provided the United States
access to up to $260 million from the IOPC Fund,277 which seems to provide an equitable
distribution of the liability for pollution damage from tanker discharges between the
tanker owner and the cargo owner. By adopting the international protocols, the United
States would be assured of prompt and certain reimbursement for cleanup costs expended
by the government for spills caused by tankers. Further, it is to be noticed that
ratification would not have prevented the United States from establishing a
complementary domestic compensation fund (over and above the international fund and
financed by e.g., taxes and fees on petroleum product S78) to cover incidents and
(1969 CLC and 1971 FC) cited by C. J. Pentis. A Comparison between United States Domestic
Pollution Acts and the International Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. Northrop University Law
Journal, Vol. 3, 1981 p. 177 ff.
277 The IOPC Fund would provide a cost-effective alternative to a purely domestic solution, because
approximately 70% of the Fund is financed by foreign sources (worldwide oil receiving interests). J.
Gallagher, New England Law Review. Vol. 25, Winter 1990 p. 615 n. 345.
: Allocation of payment made from a compensation scheme to polluting products makes it possible to
integrate such expenditure into the cost of the goods and substances that cause damage--and thus
spread the costs over a larger segment of the oil-consuming population. this method is in line with e.g.,
the OECD Council recommendation of May 26, 1972 on principles relating to economic aspects of
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circumstances not covered by the IOPC Fund 279 (naturally the United States would be
free to have its own domestic laws for situations where the CLC does not apply, such as
for spills of non-persistent hydrocarbons or spills from vessels and facilities not covered
by the CLC). As I said before, I do not absolutely oppose limitation of liability as part of
an effective and functioning comprehensive compensation system that guarantees the
claimants adequate compensation. Finally, ratification would have unified U.S. national
law (see supra) because any other federal or state law will, by necessity, be pre-empted
by the international treaties insofar as it is in conflict with them. 280
Moreover, while the CLC and FC provide a single forum for the adjudication of
claims 28 1 combined with stipulations for recognition and enforcement of judgments,282
environmental policy at the international level (C(72)128).
279 See also T. J. Schoenbaunm. The Forum. Vol. 20. 1984 p. 163 and J. Gallagher. New England Law
Review, Vol. 25, Winter 1990 p. 615. Differences between the OPA and the international protocols are
e.g.. the higher liability limits under OPA and nearly four-fold larger compensation fund created by the
OPA. It is also to be noted that the OPA imposes liability on more parties (owner, operator, demise
charterer) than does the CLC (owner). Arguably then, the more stringent liability under OPA might
increase the preventive effect of the legislation. However, in legal debate there has been unanimity that
rules governing liability schemes are relatively insufficient for accident prevention. Many accidents are
caused by human errors that are beyond the influence of liability calculations. The liability schemes are
of most importance from the point of view of distributing risk (also in the case of insurance
adjustments) and as a means of providing compensation for the injured parties. Further. in the case of
two or more persons being liable. there is risk of overlapping insurance. i.e.. all of them seek to maintain
liability insurance to protect themselves from large claims for compensation. This kind of multiple
coverage of the same risk means increased costs and recourse actions. Focusing liability on one person
also seeks to reduce disputes about liability and delays in settling liability claims.
:so US Const. Art. 6. cl. 2: "'This constitution. and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all the treaties made. or which shall be made. under the authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme law of the land: and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
:81 The CLC stipulates that proceedings shall be instituted in the contracting state where the damage
occurred and states shall ensure that their courts have the appropriate jurisdiction to handle such claims
for damages. Further, courts in the country in which a limitation fund has been established shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to handle all matters concerned with distribution of the find's resources (CLC
Art. 9, see also FC Art. 7).
282 Ajudgement given by a competent court shall be recognized and enforceable in each contracting state
(see CLC Art. 10 and FC Art. 8). It may be noted that by imposing the earlier mentioned (see Part
III. 1.1.2. supra) requirements for evidence of financial responsibility combined with direct action
provisions the OPA endeavours to safeguard claimant's position against foreign parties. See also the
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the OPA not only leaves open the possibility of a suit in state courts, but also provides for
multiple federal fora. -8
As was mentioned before the OPA now awaits natural resource damage assessment
regulations. Establishing accurate means for valuing natural resources is essential for the
effective functioning of the law. The NOAA is considering providing the trustees with a
variety of assessment procedures, and giving guidance to the trustees in selecting the
procedure most appropriate for a particular spill. The trustees could choose among the
various procedures based on the circumstances of the oil spill or the resources involved.
For example, the availability of a compensation table or computer model for a particular
spill would not necessarily rule out the use of an expedited or comprehensive damage
assessment procedure where the trustee found that neither a compensation table nor a
computer model would be the best method for assessing damages. Parallel assessments
using more than one procedure may also be allowed, provided there is no double
counting. 28 4
Finally, it remains to be seen what possible impact this sizable unilateral U.S. activity
will have on foreign legislations and on the work to unify maritime legislation performed
by such institutions and organizations as the IMO, the CMI, etc. There are already signs
interesting article by C. J. Cichetti & N. Peck. Natural Resources & Environment. Vol. 4. No. 1, Spring
1989 p. 6 ff., in which thev discuss the admissibility of CV evidence in litigation and flaws in CV
surveys used in CERCLA cases.
83 See OPA s. 2717 (b)(c). Also. T. J. Wagner. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. Vol. 21. No. 4,
October, 1990 is critical: "'The claims process is further stymied by the failure of the Act to designate a
single forum for resolution of claims. The Act thus perpetuates the redmundant process of identical
claims for pollution loss and damage being adjudicated in multiple federal and state courts. The
transactional costs and delay of such an unstructured program are exacerbated when no single forum has
jurisdiction to oversee all claims and supervise consolidated pleading. discover, motion and trial
practice" (p. 587).
284 For more information see Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 50. Friday, March 13. 1992, proposed Rules p.
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of such an influence 2'
V.2. Damage from hazardous substances
As we have also seen, damage caused by hazardous substances from ships (other than
oil) is rather well covered under U.S. compensation law. Damages for both pure
economic losses and impairment of natural resources are recoverable under the
CERCLA. However, also here we meet the dilemma mentioned above; i.e., a broad
notion of compensable damage linked to statutory liability limits. For claimants the
situation under CERCLA is worse than under the OPA because there does not seem to be
any additional unlimited liability under state law.286 But another matter is how the courts
deal with the broad CERCLA provisions lifting the statutory liability cap for
shipowners/operators. As was said before, U.S. courts seem traditionally to have been
restrictive in allowing limitation of liability.
The essential issue of natural resource damage assessment is still somewhat
unsettled-relevant court practice is lacking . But the current set of natural resource
damage assessment procedures, 43 CFR Part 11, which have been promulgated by the
DOI and modified by the Ohio and Colorado decisions, provide a solid base for damage
assessment under CERCLA-and also under the FWPCA.
Despite its clear advantages the CERCLA legislation also has some shortcomings,
8976 ff.
285 According to BIMCO Bulletin. 5/91, September/October p. 47 a significant body of government opinion
in the western world (e.g.. Canada. Germany) appears to be in favor of the U.S. precedent. And reports
suggest a growing lobby to be in favor of large-scale changes in IMO legislation following the U.S.
action.
286 Note the Limitation of Liability Act 1851. Recovery is subject to general maritime lawv even though it is
sought in the state court. See also T. J. Schoenbaum, op cit. p. 543 f.
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however. Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, and amended it in 1986, in response to
severe environmental and public health effects posed by the disposal of hazardous
wastes. Due in large part to CERCLA's enactment as a "last minute compromise" many
issues under the legislation remain unclear and not resolved. For example, the group of
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under CERCLA and the notion of "response
costs"287 need to be clarified. Under Congress' direction to let "traditional and evolving
principles of common law" govern unresolved liability issues, the courts have to fill the
gaps regarding CERCLA liability. 2  However, to push the unresolved questions on to
the courts might weaken predictability and uniformity in the application of the
legislation. Therefore courts have held uniformly that CERCLA's purpose and structure
support the development of interstitial federal common law, rather than the adoption of
state common law, to promote nationwide uniform liability standards. 289
Opinions have also been expressed on providing a private remedy for natural resource
damages under CERCLA. F. B. Cross states, inter alia,:
"Providing a private remedy for natural resource danmages is one such social arrangement
that creates an economic disincentive to harnn resources. This economic disincentive
should deter hann to natural resources. Private recovery of cleanup costs under
Superfund already has begun to spur voluntary efforts to cleanup hazardous waste sites.
The threat of recovenr may prevent the hazardous releases before resources are
harmed. "9'
A restricted expansion of the right to claim natural resource damages might be worth
287 See e.g., Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F Supp 692 (1991) p. 710.
288 See M. Conynghanm. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, Vol. 17, 1990 p. 859.
289 M. Conyngham. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. Vol. 17. 1990 p. 859 f. with
references.
290 Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol 42. 1989 p. 340.
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considering; for example, such a right could be given to certain environmental interest
groups/organizations. After all, there are some limitations on the possibilities
government and state agencies have of effectively safeguarding the interests of their
citizens. Environmental organizations often function as 'watchdogs" over industries and
activities hazardous to the environment291 and they could form an important part in a
comprehensive system to protect the environment. Further, it may be mentioned that also
internationally there is a trend to extend to environmental interest groups/organizations
the right to recover natural resource damages.' 9"
'91 Cf. M. J. Uda. Virpinia Law Journal. Vol 10. 1991 p. 432.
:9: For example. the Norwegian comprehensive rules governing liability for environmental damage (Lov av
16. juni 1989 nr. 67 om endringer I low av 13. mars 1981 nr. 6 om vern mot forurensninger og om
afall (forurensningsloven) m.v.) offer a solution by which public authorities (primarily local
governunent authorities) and private organizations with a legal interest in the case have the right to claim
reasonable compensation from the defendant(s) for restoration of the environment. Further, Art. 4.3. of
the amended EC proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste gives
"common interest groups or associations, which have as their object the protection of nature and the
environment" the right to seek the remedies (e.g., injunctions to prevent damage or impairment or to
order the reinstatement of the environment/reimbursement of costs lafuilly incurred in reinstating the
environment) available in the Directive (Art. 4.1.(b)). %within the conditions laid down by national law.
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